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4

I will add that these statements are within the confines of the protocol. As you mentioned in your question/comment, a single node could use outside resources to determine entry and exit points. However, the number of hops between the two cannot be determined. The middle nodes only know that they're talking to other nodes within the Tor network, without ...


3

That's a pretty broad question. It's possible that there could be a bug in Tor or one of the libraries which it uses that would allow someone to attack Tor relays and run malware on them. Under normal relay circumstances the harm done would be limited in impact due to restrictions on the Tor process. Running under a MAC like AppArmor as a low privileged ...


2

In general it is better to have a maximum bandwidth for the users. Tor needs some time until it reaches the maximum bandwidth and this will probably take longer than a day. So it is better to set a monthly limit.


2

Thanks for running a relay. (: Clients choose which relays to use based on their consensus weight. The consensus weight is assigned by the directory authorities after measuring the throughput for your relay. There are a number of things that can impact the speed at which your relay can be used, including the CPU speed, CPU architecture, the network ...


2

This is a thing... but it's not called Tor. There are a few network protocols that do this stuff. What you describe is probably closest to the I2P network which has torrenting built into it. You could make a torrent client that also doubled as a Tor Bridge, Relay, Exit node, but most users of it would be pissed to find their torrent-client made them a tor-...


1

Tor relays ARE chosen from random different countries. You are correct that the relays are chosen at random; tor uses three relays for every connection - the guard (node 1), middle (node 2), exit (node 3) and your relays will be different every time you use tor. The three relays will all be in different countries, tor browser allows you to see what countries ...


1

In some cases, Tor will make 4-hop circuits because extending a circuit 1 more hop is cheaper than building an entirely new one.


1

This defcon 22 talk covers most of the possible ways to get caught using Tor: All tor nodes are known (except bridges). ISP or system administrator can figure out who was using tor at a given time and from what IP. That information can be used to narrow down who is using tor and find out the suspect. People can give away a lot of information themselves. One ...


1

The only possible way to avoid malicious exit nodes with a 100% certainty is by whitelisting the exit nodes you know for sure are not malicious (i.e. those that are under your control). The way to do that is by adding the following line in the torrc file as described in the manual: ExitNodes node1,node2,node3... Otherwise, the risks of using a malicious ...


1

Your guard node and especially your exit node have a lot of power. The guard node knows who you are, or at least some basic information about you such as your IP. The exit node sees all your DNS queries, where your traffic is going, and can monitor all unencrypted traffic. Because of this, it's important there's an attempt to separate the guard node from the ...


1

I believe what you're looking for is Nyx: https://nyx.torproject.org/


1

Each link in the "chain" of nodes that make up a circuit can see who the previous and next links are, but (absent misconfiguration or attack) no more than that. So the exit node know who sent it the cell, but it doesn't know who the entry node was. The middle node knows who the entry and exit nodes are, but doesn't know who connected to the entry node (the ...


1

Yes it will work and it will be the same as running it directly on a laptop. There are some caveats though: Tor expects nodes to be stable. If you are regularly rebooting your laptop or VM or removing the USB, then this isn't a stable connection and the relay will never see much traffic. A better option would be to just install Tor on a cheap dedication ...


1

A Tor relay's descriptor is available at that relay as the resource '/tor/server/authority[.z]'. This is useful when you don't know the relay's fingerprint. Using IPredator as an example: http://197.231.221.211:9030/tor/server/authority Or, using stem: import stem.descriptor.remote dir_port = ('197.231.221.211', 9030) stem.descriptor.remote.Query(...


1

Quite a usual situation even with VPN. The reason can be one of three: GeoIP fail - There're a lot of IP-to-location databases, free and paid ones... And even the best ones and even combining the best ones can give you an artifacts like that: I used to win a one year free subscription to 4 databases by pointing my home static IP from Moscow to be identified ...


1

A node or onion router knows about other nodes what anybody can know. It's the public description of the network. It's the fingerprint, IP, exit policy and some configuration more, and the persistent public key. That's what it uses to encrypt data when sending it to the node. A node obviously know who is connecting to it from the outside. It can decrypt the ...


1

Monthly limit would be best. Daily limit would cause it to hibernate more frequently, resulting in more disrupted circuits for users, when your relay shuts down or is unexpectedly no longer in the consensus. A monthly limit would mean that such interuption only happens once per month, not every day.


1

Entry nodes generally know your IP address, the IP address of the next hop and and they can see traffic patterns. Tor sends so called cells, they have all the same size and are padded if necessary. This helps to avoid traffic correlation and figuring out the exact amount of traffic sent. This provides some protection but a sophisticated adversary might still ...


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