You can learn more about your bridge at the Globe service: http://globe.rndm.de/
For example, you can learn how much traffic your bridge pushed in the last days or weeks. You can also find out whether and how your bridge is given out to bridge users, like via email or https.
Also note that bridges that aren't given out are not useless. These bridges can ...
How many users does your cloud bridge have? Many bridges, especially new ones, haven't had their address given out to very many users yet, so they see very little activity.
At the same time, your Tor fetches directory information (list of relays in the network, whether they're up right now, etc) in order to have it ready to give users when they show up.
If by "best" you mean some combination of "most censorship resistant" and "provide the most bandwidth where it is needed"...
If you only have access to one external IP address, the best way to run multiple bridges on a single computer would be to run multiple types of pluggable transport bridges on different ports. Since you have multiple IP addresses ...
It is repeatedly warning you about the time being wrong. A synchronized clock is extremely important to make a connection to anything even if you've been able to download all of the consensus information.
7/8/2015 6:49:43 AM.695 [WARN] Our clock is 1 hours, 10 minutes behind the time published in the consensus network status document (2015-07-08 08:00:00 ...
Any captcha system can be broken by paying people.
The captcha has been attacked in the past by a nationstate adversary.
The captcha isn't critical to the security of Tor, it does present problems for censorship circumvention.
Breaking it would net you a subset of the bridges on bridgedb, it is partitioned so that a break on any one of the distribution ...
First, let's consider that "the goal is to prevent an eavesdropper on the local end from noticing Tor usage". For argument's sake, let's say that it's easier, at any particular time, to identify all VPN service entry servers than it is to identify all Tor bridges. And let's say that all Internet traffic is logged, and at least metadata (such as IP addresses, ...
The first warning in the logs is this:
11/6/2015 7:05:53 AM.400 [WARN] Our clock is 1 days, 21 hours, 54 minutes behind the time published in the consensus network status document (2015-11-08 10:00:00 UTC). Tor needs an accurate clock to work correctly. Please check your time and date settings!
So this is currently your main problem:
Tor needs an ...
I always use this feature to get new bridges but the address is different. I send "get bridges" to firstname.lastname@example.org. Actually I sent one to be sure about my answer (:D). It is working perfectly.
Also you can get new bridges through bridges.torproject.org.
In your torrc there is the line
ClientTransportPlugin obfs4 exec /usr/bin/obfs4proxy --managed
Furthermoer the log file states:
Jun 08 21:33:05.000 [warn] Could not launch managed proxy executable at '/usr/bin/obfs4proxy' ('Operation not permitted').
According to the manpage of obfs4proxy there is no option --managed. This was used for obfsproxy. So if ...
From the obfs4proxy README:
The autogenerated obfs4 bridge parameters are placed in
DataDir/pt_state/obfs4_state.json. To ease deployment, the client side
bridge line is written to DataDir/pt_state/obfs4_bridgeline.txt.
Look at http://2vlqpcqpjlhmd5r2.onion.lu/ it is a web-bridge to .onion sites, that bridges to a Freenet to Tor bridge.
EDIT: Here’s a currently working bridge, pointing to a site hosted in Freenet: https://freenet7cul5qsz6.onion.cab/freenet:USK@s9sxY2cTJWHKRsTuBTkjrXW4HfzrdUlwFqft1mzV0Gs,2E4DOMYy-~zOdp8-5OQH2IcmLfey0AOIkms-73Mx2tI,AQACAAE/freenet-funding/42/...
This is rather a non issue, I think. People typically use bridges when their Internet uplink (ISP, university, employer, etc.) blocks access to known entry guards. This may be part of national policy, as with China, Iran, etc.
Savvy adversaries monitor public lists of bridge IPs, and so the Tor Project distributes them via email. This is not a perfect ...
If you only have a single address, then the answer probably depends on how bridges are blocked.
If the adversary blocks entire hosts because they find a bridge on it, then running more on the same IP address provides little advantage. If, however, they only block the specific address:port combination, then more are better.
I don't know if we have any ...
Bridges can publish server descriptors (with contact info) in multiple ways. Private bridges are configured with
and don't publish contact info at all (you have to manually give out the bridge address to someone who needs it, then only that person gets your contact info). However, you can also configure with:
You can either search for bridges by nickname, or hashed fingerprint. The nickname starts with ec2bridge, and the hashed fingerprint is a 40-character hex string. Here's a Globe query for all EC2 bridges http://globe.rndm.de/#/search/query=ec2bridge that should include your bridge, too.
Now, I'm not sure what's the easiest way to find out either nickname ...
You can rewrite meek in php.
But it's too complicated.
There is a simple way to run a relay, just function like a meek server.
Here are code:
Basically convenience and/or choice.
Example: You've been using a particular bridge for a while - the first bridge of the three - but your ISP has now started to block it.
You can try the second bridge without needing to send a further request email. In the best case, a small time saving. In the worst case, you're in a country that blocks Gmail/Yahoo, so ...
Yes, they are taken from the bridge.
Every bridge has the latest directory information cached (just like any directory mirror), and Tor clients fetch them directly and build circuits with the bridge as an entry guard.
A bridge that has just started for few minutes could cause clients who connect to it fail since directory information has not been downloaded ...
Globe, and similar sites, will only return results for Tor relays (that is, servers that are listed in publicly available consensus documents). Tor bridges are never included in these documents (if they were, they would be easier to block).
In general, there are several ways how the proxy could figure out that PC X was using Tor. Note that not all of these attacks are straightforward to implement so it depends on how determined the proxy is. In particular, the proxy could do the following.
It could monitor to which IP addresses you are connecting to and actively probe them, i.e., ...
Setting up your own bridge on a standard Linux system is not very difficult.
Any cloud provider that provides you with an Debian or Ubuntu option would be a good start. Get the base image, install the debian packages Tor provides and configure your torrc accordingly. Optionally, add pluggable transports.
Maybe this should just be documented ...
This line if very descriptive:
27-05-2015 10:55:01.356 [WARN] Our clock is 17 hours, 4 minutes behind the time published in the consensus network status document (2015-05-28 03:00:00 UTC). Tor needs an accurate clock to work correctly. Please check your time and date settings!
Your clock is not correct. Make sure that you've set your clock and your ...
Obfs3 and Obfs4 have a goal of obscuring traffic so that it looks like arbitrary random data. Some environments have created policies such that if the protocol identified via deep packet inspection is unknown, block it. By design, obfs3/4 will never be fingerprinted as an existing protocol and therefore blocked these environments.
When you attempted to ...
You'd need to run two Tor instances, one for the published relay and the other for the bridge.
The important part will be in specifying the correct IP address to bind to and listen on for the obfs4proxy and orports.
Assuming you had two IP addresses with 18.104.22.168 being your relay and 22.214.171.124 being your bridge, your config would look something like this
Make sure your time zone and time settings are correct, if your system clock time is off, obfs4 will fail to connect.
Tails automatically synchronize time upon start, but sometimes the time synchronization may fail(the OS notify you when that happens). I'm not sure which timezone you're in, however, as a last resort, if you own the computer you're using and ...
It's quite easy I think. Let's say that you have a Freenet node installed, and are connected to some network (Strangers or Friends). The URL for accessing your node is http://127.0.0.1:8888. If you were running Tor on the same machine, you would just set up a hidden service in your torrc file with that as the HiddenServicePort. But running both Freenet and ...
There are no IPv6-specific stuff in torrc, but make sure to check all theese points :
You're running a system with IPv6 functionality enabled
You have compiled all the pre-requisites of Tor and the Tor itself without IPv6-disabling flags
You better run a local instance of ISC Bind with IPv6 and IPv4 enabled, to make sure your DNS resolving won't be glitchy.
How about bitmessage?
If Tor gives a bitmessage address to request bridges like how it is done in email.
Bitmessage is said to be encrypted P2P messaging protocol but it is still running in beta stage.