In theory, it should be just a matter of fetching /tor/rendezvous2/<hidden service identity> via HTTP from the hidden service directory responsible for that hidden service, as per the rend spec, in particular section 1.6.
In practice, you need to find the right server to download it from and then form the request correctly. That's a bit icky to do ...
The easiest way is to emulate the network, such as with ExperimenTor (which uses virtual machines) or Shadow (which uses a discrete event simulator).
With Shadow (which I have more experience with), a 20 node network should fit in 4 GB of RAM such as on a Amazon EC2 m1.large server.
Another option is Chutney, which is simpler than either ExperimenTor or ...
Usually it implies that they are breaking stuff, either maliciously or through misconfiguration.
The most common misconfiguration I have seen is using OpenDNS as a host's nameserver with what I think is the OpenDNS default configuration. Services such as OpenDNS lie to you, under the name of protecting you. The result is for instance getting redirected to ...
This netblock was owned by PSINet, one of the first and early ISPs.
PSINet was purchased by Cogent many years ago, and thus Cogent became
the owner of the netblock (220.127.116.11/16). At some point IANA, or ARIN,
or AfriNIC, or all of the above decided that the supernet to which
18.104.22.168/16 belongs, 22.214.171.124/8, was allocated to Africa. You can
see that ...
Let's start with a minor correction: there are only 9 directory authorities. You probably counted Tonga, but that's the bridge authority which is pretty much unrelated to the other 9 directory authorities. (Discussing what would happen if somebody took down the bridge authority would be, well, a separate discussion.)
Now let's distinguish three cases:
Tor ships with a list of directory authorities and some information about them.
In particular, this information includes for each authority its IP address, onion port and onion key fingerprint.
This makes it possible for clients to make an onion connection to one or more authorities for bootstrapping purposes. It then connects to the authority's DirPort ...
A directory mirror that has an max accounting set is simply not best practice.
So a directory mirror has to be reliable and always on to be useful.
Another reason is that if you set an AccountingMax it is much more important to use the limited amount of traffic for incoming client connections than using it for syncing between dirauths and your relay.
So it ...
I would say that 126.96.36.199 is located in the US, most probably DC area.
Let's look at whois 188.8.131.52:
% This is the AfriNIC Whois server.
% Note: this output has been filtered.
% Information related to '184.108.40.206 - 220.127.116.11'
inetnum: 18.104.22.168 - 22.214.171.124
I'll give it a try:
BandwidthBurst: The maximum bandwidth of short spikes in network traffic. While Tor tries to use BandwidthRate on average, it may use this value for short bursts. It was advised that this value should be four times the BandwidthRate.
BandwidthRate: The average bandwidth Tor should use.
RelayBandwidthBurst and RelayBandwidthRate: Both ...
Near the top of this page: Consensus Health, in the Signatures section, you will find a 'consensus' (and 'vote') link for each Directory Authority.
These link directly to http://ip.of.the.relay:dirport/tor/status-vote/current/consensus.
There are 9 directory authorities which are hard-coded into the Tor software. Following please find addresses and some additional information about these directory authorites:
If you did for some reason need discrete machines, some single-board computers would be good inexpensive candidates; Raspberry Pi is a bit slow, and 1024MB of RAM is better than 512MB if you're going to build a lot of circuits.
Raspberry Pi (1 ARMv6 core, safely overclockable to at least 950MHz, 512MB RAM)
BeagleBone Black (1 ARMv7 core [IIRC], ...
You can easily fetch the consensus with...
For an example of a script that compares a couple authorities see...
That said, please don't hit the authorities every five ...
As far as I see it the answer is in the source code. ;-)
The file main.c has a function run_scheduled_events. The comment to this function says:
Perform regular maintenance tasks. This function gets run once per second by second_elapsed_callback().
Within the source code there is a list of things which this function does. As far as I see it item 2c ...
directory server periodically uploads the list of nodes that are available for relaying data. client selects three nodes from this list and gets their public key using which it encrypt data multiple times and sends data to first node of the circuit. each node in the circuit decrypts one layer using their private key. and exit node send data to the ...
What is the maximum number of hidden services DHT (Distributed Hash Table) can hold?
Theoretically, the whole hash space.
Who maintains the directory?
All HSDir relays.
What stops anyone from creating a huge list of hidden services (onion addresses) that don't really exist?
However, HSDirs are still protected from this kind of DoS. Hidden ...
This is not what is actually happening. When a Tor client first starts, it does connect to the central Tor servers (Directory Authorities, they're called), but it gets the list of all Tor relays including their keys, not just a few of them. This list is signed by a majority of the Directory Authorities, so any attacker has to compromise (via technical or ...
To be a directory server, it is merely a configuration change in your TORRC. Anyone can be or advertise that you are a directory server but none of the clients would trust it. The source code for Tor is available here: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/
Found it.tor creates a directory .tor in the home directory (on Linux).
$ ls ~/.tor
cached-certs cached-microdesc-consensus cached-microdescs cached-microdescs.new lock state
$ grep -Rn 126.96.36.199
cached-microdesc-consensus:24929:r mdfnet3 uD3BVY8NNDU7uZLvk6/q/bImpz4 2015-12-26 11:02:15 188.8.131.52 9003 9032
The directory authorities above are ...
What prevents a directory server from being dishonest and give malicious data to the user?
The information served by the directories is generated by reaching a consensus between the authorities. You would have to control the majority of the authorities to manipulate the consensus. This should be fairly hard as they are neither under the control of one ...
No it does not. (..and neither does the OR traffic.)
The idea that 'traffic counts towards consensus weight' is not how it works. As I understand (from the linked document), the bandwidth is measured by building a circuit through the relay and transferring a file through it (and measuring how long that takes). So the consensus weight is not determined any ...