6 votes

Isn't it easy to de-anonymize users this way?

No, this approach will not work that simply. First of all, you've got your targeted user(s). Bob and Alice. You assume the role of Eve (a passive adversary, who can only observe). You know Bob is ...
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  • 10.8k
6 votes
Accepted

Are .onion addresses leak-proof?

No, .onion's are not exempt from DNS leaks. Since it's possible for people to run local DNS gTLDs, DNS infrastructure will generally respect and dutifully perform lookups for invalid domain names. DNS ...
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  • 10.8k
5 votes

Does windows 10 compromise TOR?

Windows 10 has a keylogger embedded, thus all the words, codes, psws that user insert using keyboard could be sent to Windows Servers and to authorities per request. Does it mean we should use "on ...
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  • 163
5 votes
Accepted

Can heartbleed be used to de-anonymize you by browsing a site via Tor?

No, not with TBB. TBB is based on Firefox ESR which doesn't use OpenSSL but NSS to do SSL/TLS. Other software that uses a vulnerable Version of OpenSSL could be exploited by a malicious server.
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  • 281
4 votes

Does cross-browser fingreprinting work in Tor Browser?

All of those are already dealt with, with the exception of AudioContext which may get a similar treatment as canvas fingerprinting has. See ticket #13017. Update: Tor Browser 7.0 disabled ...
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  • 10.8k
3 votes

Does Tor insert random delays or perform packet re-ordering to make the discovery of the communication path harder?

@Jens's answer has a great description of current Tor. The Tor-Browser adds some additional defenses, namely: it enables HTTP pipelining, so that several requests can be sent on the same "batch" it ...
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  • 387
2 votes
Accepted

Which one of the relay nodes need to get compromised for client de-anonymization?

First of all: As far as i know, if you do not compromise the Entry-Relay (Guard), you can not locate the client. So being said, the third case does not result in client de-anonymization. For the ...
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  • 134
2 votes

Why is putting a VPN between the destination and an exit node unsafe?

Short answer: Because a VPN account degrades your anonymity to pseudonymity. Long answer: All your VPN traffic is tied to a single VPN account. If one "anonymous" post (or page view) can be linked ...
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2 votes
Accepted

How do ISPs filter out Tor traffic when using a Tor Relay

An attacker has several methods to find out that you're using Tor. If you use plain Tor without bridges or other circumvention technology than the IP addresses are known to the world. An attacker ...
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  • 8,663
2 votes

Can tor nodes (entry, exit, others) store IPs?

What you say is true. This attack exists. If all the nodes are controlled by an attacker such an attack works. However Tor is designed to make it somewhat hard for one attacker to control all the ...
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  • 1,182
2 votes

Can a USB drive's serial number or unique hardware be used to identify me?

Theoretically - YES, if it will be a way to make a hardware listing query like lsusb -v
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  • 5,401
2 votes

How does de-anonymization work?

I think I can answer the first two paragraphs. I think because the entry guard node knows where a Tor user is from (compromising anonymity) and the exit node knows what that user is looking at (...
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2 votes

How to best avoid having unencrypted information logged by an exit node, if encrypted connection is not an option?

You do not have a 'best option' here the way you describe it. However - playing it over tor makes sure your real IP stays hidden. The exit node does not get to know your IP, but as you say - the exit ...
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  • 1,863
2 votes

Do vulnerabilities exist in Tor Browser Bundle

The article is mostly wrong headed, at least in how the article presents it. tl;dr - Tor Browser does a great job of making you anonymous against passive observers, it lacks against active ...
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  • 10.8k
2 votes

Whonix Workstation Country Code

Packets won't carry your local time information, application data will though. You probably want to make your timezone UTC since this is the most "generic" timezone and the easiest to calculate your ...
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  • 10.8k
2 votes
Accepted

Can a HSDir see visited onion url's?

Yes, currently HSDirs can see the looked up .onion hostname. This does not include the full URL but just the .onion hostname. Proposal 224 (ticket #12424) will fix this issue. See also #8106. If you ...
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  • 1,342
2 votes

A server behind a physical Tor gateway to hide its location

Whonix is what you want. The Workstation VM can "see" only IP addresses on the Internal LAN, which are the same in every Whonix installation. User applications therefore have no knowledge of ...
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  • 1,863
2 votes

Should use same ISP for Tor and Real life?

There is no direct problem in connecting to Tor from the connection that you also use to perform other activities, assuming that it is safe for you to use Tor in the first place (I.E. that it's not ...
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  • 10.8k
2 votes

Is this setup to send anonymous email secure?

When you go to the place with the open wifi, you should additionally check if the place is physically secure. This means no cameras, no people who could shoulder-surf etc. Furthermore if you connect ...
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  • 8,663
2 votes
Accepted

Clearing the state of rendezvous client provides privacy improvement?

Is there a risk the server can learn the connection between Alice and Bob without clearing the state of the rendezvous client? If so, then how much of this risk is? Yes. It could be possible for an ...
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  • 10.8k
1 vote

Can I permanently blow my anonimity on Tor?

Oh man! You need to sell everything you own now!!! :D All that happened is your accounts are logged with a known Tor exit node. Thus, you are identified as a Tor user now if logs are checked for any ...
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  • 121
1 vote

Can I permanently blow my anonimity on Tor?

It's probably not that big of a mistake, as long as you obtained a new Tor identity after you were done (e.g., quit the Tor browser bundle, then restarted it before using Tor for more anonymous ...
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  • 121
1 vote
Accepted

Are there Tor modifications that do NOT expose uniqueness?

It seems that using a simple appearance add-on will not increase the uniqueness of your browser fingerprint (unless it weirdly modified any of the items below). No, moving those UI items shouldn't ...
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  • 86
1 vote

Tor Networking Anonimity

Does each relay NAT the traffic or something? Something like that. Instead of NAT sessions, you have circuits. From your client to the guard, from the guard to the next node, etc.. are all ...
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  • 3,745
1 vote

Knowing all differences between Tor browser and normal Firefox to foil Tor detection techniques

how we can modify Tor browser to hide these footprints and look like a normal firefox user? You cannot, some of Tor Browsers changes are hard coded patches. Trying to undo some of them by ...
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  • 10.8k
1 vote

Knowing all differences between Tor browser and normal Firefox to foil Tor detection techniques

I do not think it is the intention of Tor to be undetectable, rather it is designed to make you indistinguishable from others. According to this post in SO, a browser can be a TBB if it: Has a User-...
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  • 708
1 vote

Risk of deanonymization running thousands of hidden service on same server

There are multiple factors and tradeoffs at play here: First off, how many Tor instances are you using? The biggest protection against deanonymization are the guard nodes of your Tor instance, the ...
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  • 2,209

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