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Currently not every fast exit is also assigned the Guard flag. There was a change reported at TWN of July, 30th 2014:
Once directory authorities have upgraded, they will “assign the Guard flag to the fastest 25% of the network”. Some experiments showed that “for the current network, this results in about 1100 guards, down from 2500.”
If I'm correct the ...
5
Each authority votes on what they think the proper flags are for your relay.
Currently it seems 5 think angrykitteh should have the Guard flag, and 4 think it shouldn't yet. Depeding on which authorities manage to vote for which consensus, the flag might end up being set in the consensus or not.
I suppose in a while the remaining 4 authorities will also ...
answered Dec 30 '13 at 17:21
weasel - Peter Palfrader
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4
Currently Tor chooses 3 entry guards. There may be much fewer entry guards than Tor users, but as you fear, when combining 3 randomly chosen entry guards they indeed become a unique fingerprint for you. At least very very few users have the same set of entry guards as you do, and probably no one else at your geographical location.
It will be very easy for ...
4
The Tor spec says:
5.3. Creating circuits
When creating a circuit through the network, the circuit creator
(OP) performs the following steps:
Choose an onion router as an exit node (R_N), such that the onion
router's exit policy includes at least one pending stream that
needs a circuit (if there are any).
Choose a chain ...
3
Your question is two fold. So :
1) "get into my traffic and find out my location" For this, you need tor. Install Orbot from f-droid.org client.
2) "see what I was saying" For this, you need something like OTR or any other end-to-end encrypted protocol like axolotl.
2.a) Install a chat client with OTR support. Install Chatsecure from f-droid.org client. ...
3
Tor is only used for tunneling TCP packets. By default traceroute sends UDP or ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) packets, ergo it can't be routed through Tor.
However, it's also possible to send TCP SYN's to do essentially the same thing. If you used traceroute to print a series of SYN-ACK's, you would see the path from the exit node to the final ...
3
Also all my circuits are now being built by zwiebelringrexlocus
My circuits no longer seem to be popping around different connections and cities... whats happened?
zwiebelringrexlocus is your (new?) guard node. It is normal and by design that you keep using the same guard for a long time.
The 2nd and 3rd node in your circuits are all different. You do ...
3
Even if you got this to work, it wouldn't benefit the Tor network. Proxies tend to be slow and unreliable, so your relay would be as well.
Also, a Tor relay wouldn't go unnoticed for very long. Few students are online 24/7, as the relay (with luck) would be. And given your comment about the admin, you would soon be in trouble.
You could use your own ...
3
You can find the advertised bandwidth values in the bandwidth.csv file, which is linked below each metric graph.
As explained on the Tor Metrics Portal: Statistics page, each row of this file has the following fields:
date,isexit,isguard,advbw,bwread,bwwrite,dirread,dirwrite
The rows where isguard column is t(rue) will give you the bandwidth for the ...
2
How is this adversary figuring out what entry guards you are using?
Assuming it does from you connecting to Tor on an access point owned by them.
There are more Tor users than entry guards, so one entry guard is used by multiple people which will help with matters.
Also, how is he logging where data from the entry guard is going? (this is just a ...
2
You can find your EntryGuards in your data directory. If you are using the Tor Browser Bundle, you have the list in Data/Tor/state. In other cases there will be a .tor directory in your home directory or similar.
Currently Tor selects 3 EntryGuards per default. This setting may however be changed using NumEntryGuards. There is another option that is called ...
2
Bridge, is designed to act as entry node (guard). There is no difference as far as number of hops with or without bridges when you connect to a given server. If there were three hops required to connect to given server without a bridge, there are three hops required to connect to a given server with a bridge. This include the bridge as a first of three hops ...
2
First of all: As far as i know, if you do not compromise the Entry-Relay (Guard), you can not locate the client. So being said, the third case does not result in client de-anonymization.
For the other two cases, in which you have compromised the entry-relay, you will be able to locate the client.
To be a little more specific:
Before there were Entry-Guard ...
2
I am in the same situation. My relay is jobiwan. Guard flag has been wild lately.
I believe this happens when your bandwidth is just about enough to be guard. The authorities vote 4 against 5 or 5 against 4 and small fluctuations in your consensus weight fraction can flip the balance.
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You know that some rogue entry node isn't faking Tor circuits because your Tor client specifies the relays used in each circuit, and because the circuit-creation process requires that each relay demonstrate that it possesses the proper private key. In order to mount such an attack, an adversary would need to compromise most Tor relays, in order to get their ...
2
TL;DR The answer will depend on what you consider important, and what your Tor use-case is. (Similar to the hand-waving over threat models mentioned in another answer.)
However, in general, the recommendations would be to:
Use fewer guards;
Keep the guards for longer.
These are described in Part 3 of a post on the offical Tor blog, which references 3 ...
2
Proposal 236, which has been implemented by now, explains the behavior:
When this proposal becomes effective, clients will switch to using
a single guard node.
That is, in its first startup, Tor picks one guard and stores its
identity persistently to disk. Tor uses that guard node as the first
hop of its circuits from thereafter.
If that ...
2
Do Tor authority servers, or probing servers, or those clients who were dropped by the malicious guard have any mechanism to report it to the authority servers so that the malicious guard will be rejected in the next consensus vote?
Malicious relays should be reported to bad-relays@lists.torproject.org, along with the malicious activity, the fingerprint of ...
1
If you relay has been upgraded to a guard node (this takes time to gain the trust of the network, enough bandwidth, speed, etc.) then it is possible that your relay could be your guard but it's not guaranteed that it will be.
1
Entry nodes generally know your IP address, the IP address of the next hop and and they can see traffic patterns. Tor sends so called cells, they have all the same size and are padded if necessary. This helps to avoid traffic correlation and figuring out the exact amount of traffic sent. This provides some protection but a sophisticated adversary might still ...
1
From what I can see from reading the code, it picks one guard if NumEntryGuards is not defined in the consensus. It is currently defined in the consensus but it is also set to one guard.
That guard is kept, by default, for 2 months (there is some random variance since it obscures the time the guard was initially picked), if GuardLifetime were defined in the ...
1
All relays are suitable for all positions in ciruits. How clients use them depends on their assigned flags, with the exception of exiting traffic which is defined by their chosen exit policies.
So you will potentially act to some users as a guard and others as an intermediary (not always just the "middle") and possibly an exit to others (if you have a ...
1
Both Linostar and user1552 have mentioned practical ways to help you to achieve what you are looking for. However, there is at least one addtional way that your location maybe computed. That method is called triangulation. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triangulation
What basically triangulation refer to in the sense of figuring out your location while you ...
1
Since each hidden service keeps a list of guard nodes, revealing the guards gives the attacker the next point of attack. Since both hidden services and guard nodes are valid for a long time (more than a month in case of guard nodes), this also gives the attacker/advocacy ample time to take control over the guard nodes or mount legal attack or recovery ...
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i'm programming in python an application related to Tor with stem library.
when i create new paths sometimes the guard node (entry) belongs to the same family (group of servers) as the exit node.
This is close to your case
the main problem that carries in both cases the connections can be analyzed based on time responses and patterns and being 'uncovered'.
...
1
Here's my 2nd answer:
If someone else is trying DoSing you over the Tor network there is a chance that this will be prevented from the guard relay. If not it could be an advantage for other relay operators because the traffic that flows through the network goes up to their score.
If this someone is DoSing you over the normal internet I see no chance for ...
1
A directory guard is a relay that your Tor client picked to download directory information from. Directory information is metadata about the Tor network - the list of relays (consensus), and descriptors for all the relays. This can be different from the relay you're using to make anonymized connections. The sentence is implying that this scheme I've ...
1
The guard nodes are individual per Tor process. So if you have a GNU/Linux machine and a local Tor daemon installed and also use the Tor Browser Bundle as packaged version, there are two Tor binaries on your system. Both use a different set of guard nodes and does not synchronise them in any way.
You can find the guard nodes of your Tor process by looking ...
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