Hot answers tagged

7

Tor maintains a descriptor store which keeps all the descriptors it knows about. New descriptors enter the store after being downloaded, old descriptors get expired when they haven't been referenced and are outdated. The client regularly fetches a new consensus document and fetches all the descriptors that it doesn't have and that are referenced in the ...


5

No. Tor traffic does not necessarily all exit at the same exit node. For each socket connection that the client sets up, a circuit is used that ends in an appropriate exit node. That is an exit node that allows the IP and port the client is trying to reach.


4

Short answer is no. It is possible to do so, but would very much lower the anonymous nature of your traffic. It would be best to run A relay node 24/7 to increase the amount of "fast" circuits that you connect to.


4

Ok, I figured this out. For some reason the custom onion address I made with Shallot was no longer working. I made a new hidden service and got rid of the existing one, restarted Tor, and voila! I'm not sure why this happened, but this solved both hidden services that had stopped working.


3

Good and detailed question, but you're misunderstanding a key point about descriptors. A descriptor doesn't change, once you've downloaded it you don't update it. This is guaranteed by using hashes - if a new descriptor is generated, it will have a new hash value, so the new descriptor is fetched. The check every 10 seconds just means that we'll try to fetch ...


3

A Tor onion service host chooses several Tor nodes to serve as the host's introduction points. The host builds circuits to those nodes, and tells the nodes to use those circuits to forward introduction requests from clients to the onion service. When a client wants to connect to the onion service, the client first chooses a Tor node at random to be its "...


3

Tor itself seems to pick reasonable circuits these days. There is no support for picking a certain set of nodes based on the properties you want, and if there was, it's unclear if that'd help.


3

As far as I see it the answer is in the source code. ;-) The file main.c has a function run_scheduled_events. The comment to this function says: Perform regular maintenance tasks. This function gets run once per second by second_elapsed_callback(). Within the source code there is a list of things which this function does. As far as I see it item 2c ...


3

What does Tor Browser test for that fails when using a different / non-local Tor as the client? With the default settings, Tor Browser: Starts its own instance of Tor when you first open the browser Asks the browser what proxy settings have been set in the TorButton Preferences menu Asks the instance of Tor that the browser started what SOCKS proxy address ...


2

From what I gathered, I have not found anything that point that a client periodically fetch the consensus file. On the other hand, consensus files do expire, and when that happens the client will request the latest version. If you set TestingTorNetwork in torrc to 1, one of the properties tested will be the frequency of fetching the consensus file. The ...


2

There are two different questions lurking here. When you use Tor to connect to a website, the IP address of the Tor exit node will, of necessity, be visible to the website that is being contacted. In addition, the IP addresses of Tor exit nodes are public, so it is easy for a website to learn that the user is using Tor, which is quite a different matter ...


2

There are multiple practical reasons where five ORs of bandwidth X MB/s each could be superior to one OR of bandwidth 5X MB/s. There are some restrictions and exceptions to this point in general. This list is not meant to be the comperhensive list of all possible advantages and/or disadvantages, but give you enough clues to get the idea. Let us start and ...


2

The Tor project provides a list of entry nodes, so they can block those by IP address. But then there are bridges that aren't in the list that can act as an entry node. But if the censor is using DPI (Deep Packet Inspection) to examine packets and block those that look as if they are Tor, then a user can try Pluggable Transports aka Meek that obfuscate the ...


2

Every client that doesn't get its consensus from some other source (clients that use bridges get theirs from the bridge they connect to) will have to connect to the Directory Authorities once at first startup, and again if they're offline for a day or longer. Tor metrics should take this into account when calculating user numbers.


2

TL;DR The answer will depend on what you consider important, and what your Tor use-case is. (Similar to the hand-waving over threat models mentioned in another answer.) However, in general, the recommendations would be to: Use fewer guards; Keep the guards for longer. These are described in Part 3 of a post on the offical Tor blog, which references 3 ...


2

(Just to add to the other answers with one that's possibly quite simplistic and obvious... ) So should users like me (who are personally not bothered about anonymity) follow different recommendations and use Tor for as much normal activity as possible, to make it easier for others to hide? Just by using the network you're increasing the size of its ...


2

Running a relay is a great start if you have the resources, but using Tor for at least some of your daily browsing does help make Tor traffic look more "normal" indeed. If websites see more of their everyday users coming from Tor then they should see less of a threat. As you come across sites which block Tor traffic, contact the site owners to tell them you ...


2

Short: it does not send a command. It creates new connection to SocksPort, using different credentials, and sends new requests to domain through it. Details: Tor do isolates streams to different domains through different circuits. I don't know why exactly, but TBB tries to harden isolation by // __tor.isolateCircuitsByDomain()__. // For every HTTPChannel, ...


2

Tor clients keep a pool of circuits and may use several circuits simultaneously for streams depending on factors such as exit policies, stream isolation, etc. So there is generally not a single "in-use" circuit. And it's not quite true that a circuit is used for only a max of 10 minutes. Generally a circuit is marked as "dirty" (unusable ...


2

If you plan on using the standard tor implementation, then yes you will need to use some form of local proxy. If you don't want to bind the SOCKS port to a localhost address, you can also use a unix domain socket instead. For example using SocksPort unix:/home/user/tor-socks.unix. If you want to avoid using a local proxy, then you will need to build the Tor ...


1

You can find this in the manual... There are tons of different handlers against bandwidth, as client-node, the same as a relay-node... e.g. GENERAL OPTIONS BandwidthRate N bytes|KBytes|MBytes|GBytes|TBytes|KBits|MBits|GBits|TBits A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node to the specified number of bytes per ...


1

For Tor Browser there are various ways to check what the latest Tor Browser version is: The Firefox updater uses this XML file to determine if there is an update available (note that the URL is specific to the architecture). All currently downloads and a version are also available in JSON using the gettor API. There is also RecommendedTBBVersions, but ...


1

I think this is a known bug. See: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/14269


1

Simple answer: No. Tor is not working on layer 2. Tor uses a socks proxy to receive data from applications. All TCP headers would be dropped and payload would be reassembled into "cells". Destination is included in socks header and Tor puts it (only destination, not source) in relay cells so that exit relay would know your destination. Application headers (e....


1

how does the node after know where to transmit the packet afterwards? And how would the Exit relay know to which IP it is to finally route the traffic to? Simply put: Your client first selects the three nodes that it will use. Next, it encrypts your msg with the public key of the exit node. Then it encrypts that with the public key of the middle node, then ...


1

Well,it`s complicated,I guess these two links can help :https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Secure Note this :"Everything in the HTTPS message is encrypted, including the headers, and the request/response load. With the exception of the possible CCA cryptographic attack described in the limitations ...


1

You will be very interested in a document on the tor metrics website that explains the collected data further. Please let me know if there is anything missing there, and I'll try and improve this answer (as well as getting the document fixed).


Only top voted, non community-wiki answers of a minimum length are eligible