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5

The first option to explore should be to make the service less vulnerable to DoS attacks. The Tor network is small compared to an average botnet and is overloaded. If you design a service to resist attack by a botnet then it already should resist attack by someone using Tor. If your service can't resist attack from a Tor user without blocking Tor nodes then ...


2

This would generally hurt you more than the Tor network. Directory Authorities will receive your request to create a metric bajillion hidden services, let's say, but this is basically just a half of a hash - a very tiny file. This, plus the fact that any node has the ability to to be a mirror and therefore offload this value makes it difficult to see a ...


2

The examples you mention do not apply: Tor only works with TCP streams, not UDP. It is probably easier to overload the Tor that hosts the Hidden Service than the actual web server behind it, by just creating lots of connections. Setting up a circuit is much more work than serving up a simple web page.


2

Is there any other serious obstacle for such attacks over Tor? Many services will automatically block exit nodes, or will be more strict with detecting possible attacks from exit nodes. Even if they are not blocked now, they will be blocked in the future once an attack occurs, screwing over both the attacker and innocent Tor users. Are there known cases ...


2

Do Tor authority servers, or probing servers, or those clients who were dropped by the malicious guard have any mechanism to report it to the authority servers so that the malicious guard will be rejected in the next consensus vote? Malicious relays should be reported to bad-relays@lists.torproject.org, along with the malicious activity, the fingerprint of ...


1

Some guy on #tor@oftc.net are saying that there is an attack (ddos) to some relay... is that true ? Not for all relays, at least (I operate one). There are around 6000-7000 relays, its unlikely any attacker would be able to siginificantly impact the entire Tor network at once. Beyond that, I've experienced no speed losses myself so even if one could, they'...


1

Not yet, to my knowledge. The concept is rather useless, by the way - at least with present Tor architecture: yes, it makes DoS a bit more difficult to perform, and no, DoS is an avalanche-like process, so DoSing 2,4,6,8,10,1,14,16,20 nodes - actually, it's no difference at all


1

Tor Network's goal is to provide anonymity and circumvention for the users in need of them. Deploying any kind of attack, is simply abusing the Tor Network. Targets of the attack, or even network providers of the targets, probably will block the exit or all Tor nodes. This would mean seriously degrading the Tor user experience, since they will not be able to ...


1

There are 2 kinds of malicious traffic: Traffic that is the same as 'normal' traffic, but the amount/volume makes it malicious. [D]DoS. (I don't really have an answer for this one.) Traffic that has been crafted to trigger and exploit bugs in the server software or host OS. For the 2nd kind, now that the easy semi-fix of blocking IPs doesn't work anymore,...


1

Here's my 2nd answer: If someone else is trying DoSing you over the Tor network there is a chance that this will be prevented from the guard relay. If not it could be an advantage for other relay operators because the traffic that flows through the network goes up to their score. If this someone is DoSing you over the normal internet I see no chance for ...


1

There really isn't an easy way to discover a persons IP address through Tor. The problem for you is really deployment. In my (not so professional) opinion, your best bet would be to have each user set up their own hidden service, and the two hidden services exchange the .onion address through a man in middle. Kinda like this: User #1's .onion => man in ...


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