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What Net Neutrality and Title II Is First of all, it's very important to note that the current Net Neutrality debate (Title II and the FCC) only affects the United States of America. While it could have an effect on American Tor nodes, the Tor network as a whole would be more-or-less just the same. Net Neutrality means that all Internet traffic should be ...


3

Your question is two fold. So : 1) "get into my traffic and find out my location" For this, you need tor. Install Orbot from f-droid.org client. 2) "see what I was saying" For this, you need something like OTR or any other end-to-end encrypted protocol like axolotl. 2.a) Install a chat client with OTR support. Install Chatsecure from f-droid.org client. ...


2

Yes, CapLoader can identify the Tor version of SSL, as we've demonstrated here: http://netresec.com/?b=13400BE The "TOR Packet Analysis" report (linked by @Aurora) simply classifies traffic to TCP 9001 as Tor. However, Tor traffic usually runs on several other ports, like TCP 443. CapLoader, on the other hand, does not rely on the TCP port number for the ...


2

Netresec is a for profit organization, that is attempting to sell a product. If you want to examine tor packets, take a look at this great article.


2

I don't know if I can mark the question as solved since I am not registered, but here's the (I believe) correct answer: The issue seems to be that the entry node uses the same port as IMAP protocol, leading Wireshark to believe that the traffic is IMAP. Unfortunately, Wireshark doesn't seem to analyze headers by default, leading to this confusing issue.


2

I think I can answer the first two paragraphs. I think because the entry guard node knows where a Tor user is from (compromising anonymity) and the exit node knows what that user is looking at (compromising privacy) and thus, it give the clearer overall picture to the attacker if they have control of these two points. I don't think its as useful to analyze ...


2

As far as I know it is still possible to do those kind of attacks against the network. However Tor tries to detect bad relays and block them from participating in the network. So there is a high chance that your research doesn't lead to satisfactory results. Tor has created a Research Safety Board. You can ask them for advice on how to best conduct your ...


1

Tor doesn't use per-user prioritization because this is very difficult to do in an anonymity network. Instead each relay uses per-circuit prioritization. The main use-case for Tor is interactive web applications such as web browsing, so Tor uses EWMA circuit prioritization to prioritize "bursty" circuits for interactive applications rather than ...


1

One reason to not run a service on any node is that one could see a correlation between your node and your service. Someone could see that your service is down every time your node goes down.


1

The Tor documentation suggests not to host an exit relay on your home network (or at least if it's byour only connection) because all your local traffic will be viewed as coming from Tor as well, and some websites will block it. Actually, it's much more than that. I suggest that you read Tips for Running an Exit Node before starting to run an exit node. It ...


1

Is your bridge being published as available on https://bridges.torproject.org/? If not, then theres a good chance that nobody know about it. You can also contact the Tor Bridges mailing list for specific help about your bridge.


1

Take a look at Nyx. That is probably how most relay operators on Linux get their bandwidth and connection information.


1

"Wire tapping" is targeted surveillance. They intercept your internet communications, normally with assistance from your ISP (through systems like CALEA) and log them. It is necessarily one-sided. In this case, they would be able to see you were using Tor, what times you were using Tor and how much traffic you were sending over the Tor network. They would ...


1

Tor works by encrypting your traffic with three layers of encryption, and relaying it through a set of three nodes, an entry node, a relay node, and an exit node. Each one of these nodes peels off a layer of encryption, making sure that the only unencrypted traffic is between the exit node and the internet. The use of three separate nodes makes the tracing ...


1

2nd point: it's as simple as hell to give you one cookie/tracker to merge it. The tracking itself may be not a trivial task, but Tor Browser is a browser after all, so it can not defeat some fingerprinting techniques as all the other browsers. To be 100% sure of splitting two sessions use two dedicated VM's with browsers in them and use per-client chain ...


1

Tor usage will increase your traffic. When you're using Tor, you'll need to download information about all Tor relays (directory information). This list of all relays is downloaded when you start Tor Browser for the first time and updated on a regular basis. You won't have this kind of traffic on a non-Tor connection. Tor uses encryption for all internal ...


1

Both Linostar and user1552 have mentioned practical ways to help you to achieve what you are looking for. However, there is at least one addtional way that your location maybe computed. That method is called triangulation. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triangulation What basically triangulation refer to in the sense of figuring out your location while you ...


1

What you describe is a timing attack. (See here: https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#AttacksOnOnionRouting ) In order to perform it, you need a birds-eye view of the network. Only very few parties have this. Splitting/joining packets in a stream would not help (much) against this, as you could still analyse the change in volume. Unless you take ...


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