Tails is a live Linux operating system that routes all traffic through Tor. Tails can handle many use cases well and is the way to go if you need to torify applications apart from your browser. Please take a look at Tails first, understand its features and threat model before you advance.
Remember the Tor Project suggests only two ways to use Tor: Tor ...
> Running normal applications has the problem that any remote code
> execution vulnerability in the application totally compromises the
> user. This isn't just a theoretical attack, a vulnerability in Firefox
> was used to compromise visitors of hidden services hosted by freedom
> hosting in August 2013.
Never rely on the virtual machine against ...
There are several anonymity concerns when you use your main machine for communication. Running a separate secured OS will give you advantages when you use other software with Tor than just the Firefox in the Tor Browser Bundle which is considerably secured. The separate secured OS can also help you against possible information leak vulnerabilities in Firefox....
Have you considered using Whonix? It comprises two virtual machines, one of which is a gateway and the other a workstation. You work as normal on the workstation, with every network request being funnelled through the gateway and hence through Tor.
Some advantages and some concerns to point out, partly in reference to pabouk's answer:
When you run a Tor VM, chances are high that the VM software is based on some operating system other than Windows. Because Windows still has a huge market share, most publicly-known software vulnerabilities target Windows, and most man-hours spent researching ...
The Tor client uses TLS to encrypt connections between clients and relays, as well as between relays. TLS was selected primarily because it is standardised, well analysed and offers reasonable security. An added benefit however is that TLS is used in HTTPS for encrypted web browsing so Tor traffic is tricky to distinguish from HTTPS. While many networks ...
Qubes-Whonix integration is now extremely good. I use it myself and highly recommend it. (Qubes TorVM is now deprecated.)
You can read all about Qubes-Whonix on the Qubes website here and on the Whonix website here.
Thanks go to adrelanos and all the other devs whose hard work made this happen.
Old answer (2014-08-17):
Qubes TorVM ...
I generally agree with the pros and cons of VMs presented by others here, provided you control the physical host as well.
If you do not (for example you're running a VM on a public cloud provider) the operator can see all the memory in your VM which is pretty much game over for anonymity. You need to be the judge of how likely this is and what is at risk if ...
There is a whole bunch of pros and cons about this.
One of the biggest advantages is that proxy by-pass bugs in Tor Browser when using a Transparent Proxy (anonymizing middlebox!) or an Isolating Proxy design won't reveal your real IP address. Also, with such a design, (root) exploits against your client software (ex: browser) won't instantly reveal your ...
Tor should work fine on ARM CPUs.
On distributions like Debian there are Tor versions for arm, arm64, armel, armhf (even mips, mipsel and powerpc). The Tor Project themselves also distribute debian packages for armhf and armel.
Fedora (and likely other redhat derivatives) also distributes a [Tor package for armv7hl.
ArchLinux for ARM similarly package Tor ...
I would strongly recommend against this. Infact other software that requires dkms modules is explicitly recommended against by the Tails developers. It is not officially supported by them. Inserting random code into the kernel may entirely violate protections intended to be provided by Tails.
I'm unsure if it is possible to include extra kernel drivers ...
You can do this with Whonix for example, which is a ready-to-run virtual machine that acts as a tor proxy.
All the details on how to do this is here:
There are multiple correct answers to a question like this because its vauge. If you want a whonix copy why not use whonix? One other easy way to build a gateway would be to download the openwrt x86 iso and install it to its own virtual machine, then install and configure tor as a transparent proxy, then configure your networking to use the interfaces on ...
If you will be able to put them in different C-class subnets on a static IPv4 addresses - then run as much as you need. Actually, you can set the cpu count to 2, it's ok because the crypto part in Tor is still single-thread
Tor works pretty fine on ARM - I'm running my nodes on ARM SBC's myself. You need to compile it by hand and OpenSSL and Libevent to avoid perfomance loss. If you need specific instructions - just say it!
The first things, I usually check,when I have this kind of problems, are:
verify, if used, firewall rules
use a traceroute command to follow the path done from your data
I give as sure you already verified, but if not check correct gateway configuration
Usually the first point is the goal: a lot of people forget to setup correctly the ...
This usually happens when your whonix version is 9.4 or below. It is a known bug that will be fixed in version 9.6. For now, here is how you can fix it:
Open a terminal in Whonix, then copy & paste the following lines into it:
gpg --recv-keys "$fpr"
gpg --fingerprint "$fpr"
gpg --export "$fpr" | sudo apt-...
Do you mean relays or clients with browsers? Your mention of users and screens and browsers suggests the latter. The question you link to is also about Tor Browser, not relays.
A ready-made Tor client + Browser that you could run in a VM is Tails.
I would question the usefulness of a ready-made relays because
For relays it is not important to look ...
If you're not a relay and if you're not hosting a hidden service, then you can run multiple instances with exactly the same config.
If you are running a hidden service, then each introduction point will use the one that it heard about last. All instances should function though.
If you are running a relay, then each instance must have its own unique keys ...
You could check the list of Guard nodes from onionoo, for example at this Web site: https://onionoo.torproject.org
You may also filter the traffic to the addresses of your interest for better visibility.
Sorry I did not understand your question at first. You should be able to run other operating systems with a whonix gateway. You will just need to configure the network connection of the workstation. I would boot up the workstation that comes with whonix and look at the network configuration and use those same settings on the workstation of your choice.
I've yet to find a better way to do it, but the problem is that Firefox either can't resolve .onion domains, or resolution of .onion is blocked in newer versions of Firefox.
You'll need to configure your browser to use Tor's SOCKS proxy to surf .onion domains (Preferences >> Advanced >> Network >> Settings).
In your case, 127.0.0.1 might not be the SOCKS ...
Running Tails in a VM is not recommended since the host OS and VirtualBox itself can see what you're doing inside the VM.
And if your host OS is infected/owned, the attacker can see what you do on Tails as well. I recommend reading Tails warning page before doing anything. And maybe install Tails on a USB stick instead of running it on a VM.
And oh, the ...
I wrote a guide for this, I was asked to transcribe it to the Tor Project wiki so that it was as easier to find resource (and so that I didn't have editorial authority over it).
You can find the wiki page here TorBrowserBundleSAQ, as far as I am aware there have been no changes to it since I originally transcribed it from my original version but edits, ...
The checklist is:
pluggable transports: obfs3, obfs4, meek
pre-seeding first on a working conection
using no entry guards
post your logs, so I'll be able to help you further
UPDATE: So thats "what is this, what it's for and how exactly can it help in your case": Grade-zero: a very valuable addition to your question will be a tor run log, so it will be ...
Short answer: If you're sure you understand and accept the fingerprinting risks, then yes, it's fine to use regular Firefox (or any application) in an AppVM connected to a Whonix-Gateway.
It sounds like you may be conflating Qubes OS with Qubes-Whonix. Qubes OS can run many different types of VMs in addition to Whonix-based VMs.
So, the ...
Your second computer must have two separate ISP's with different IP addresses, and it should be no problem at all : you will use two virtual machines, one for "using net securely", you will connect to it's VNC through Tor for a first time via first Internet connection, and this VM will go outside through a second VM, that will be a Tor router, WAN-bridged to ...