I pay for it, I run a relay.
You too could help cover the cost of providing the service to users if you have the resources to spare, some time to work through some documentation and the inclination.
From the "What is Tor?" answer on the Tor Project FAQ:
Tor is a program you can run on your computer that helps keep you safe on the Internet. It protects ...
Every relay is important for the diversity of the network. The anonymity is the direct result of diversity of the network. Diversity of number of relays, diversity of number users, diversity of nature of network usage, diversity of number of directory authorities, etc. Without the diversity you may as well forget about anonymity. One can make a mathematical ...
No, a very slow (whatever that means) relay would not help. No traffic is directed to a relay below a certain bandwidth threshold. Any adversary can disregard all nodes below that threshold when considering which nodes to watch.
Besides, do you really want your traffic to be routed through someones 64KB/sec soda-straw? Yeah, no one else does either.
The type of attack you are describing is a congestion attack. In theory, the simplest form of such an attack would be a general DoS on the Tor network.
Taking things one step further, a congestion attack could be used in conjunction with traffic correlation to monitor a given user of the Tor network. Such a strategy is discussed in A Practical Congestion ...
Actually, the people who host the nodes. It's quite common to have an unmetered/unlimited Internet plans, so running a node costs no more than a regular Internet usage. Sometimes people do run it on VPS or physical servers - but if chosen correctly, the cost is near-zero.
Yes, someone already tried to do the calculation:
To sum up, that would make the entire Tor network run for approximately $90,000 a month or $1,072,860 a year. Roughly the price for a (very) small tier 3 datacenter!
Considering there are 1.6 million users using Tor, that would make the average user cost under a dollar per year — which is pretty cheap ...
There is no way short of the hypothetical attacks you mentioned to determine if a relay is excessively logging. Excessive logging is a criterion for considering a relay malicious but that doesn't mean that there's a way to verify that it is actually logging sensitive information. However, if a relay operator openly admits to logging data that they shouldn't, ...
It takes about 1 day for an IP address to be removed from the most recent exit list, but that directory contains exit lists published in the past 3 days. So, that's 4 days for an IP address to disappear from that directory after stopping the relay. However, there's also https://collector.torproject.org/archive/exit-lists/ which archives exit addresses ...
Actually, I think that might not be the case... If we were to grow the network to have more fast relays than users, that would most likely harm the anonymity. There would be high probability that each relay would only forward traffic of one or two users at any given time, which would make it easier for an adversary to "spy" on the route that a certain user ...
I solved this issue with following:
RendPostPeriod N (I set it on 20 minutes)
Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 1 hour)
HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints NUM (I set to 7)
Create a file named checkifisonline.sh (give it permission read and write) allow Executable ) working in ubuntu or whonix or in tails drag and Drop in the terminal and hit enter ..
*remember to change the onion site in the script for yours.. and to put the path to the music .mp3 ..
When the ...
Is there a way to enfource a new route towards my hidden services so I
can circumvent the peers that are failing?
From the Tor Project website, we see:
An onion service needs to advertise its existence in the Tor network
before clients will be able to contact it. Therefore, the service
randomly picks some relays, builds circuits to them, and asks ...
Using your phone as a relay will take up some of your phones computing power but what I'd be worried about is mainly the bandwitdth, if you lose connection to wifi you will use up data quickly. Along with using WiFi you will stand out if you are on a public WiFi and probably not a good idea I'm home wifi.
All in all it isn't worth it
I think it is important to continue to spread the word. I can see my peers opening up to Tor after they understand it is not 'just for criminals' but serves a greater purpose for everyone.
My way of helping is to run my own relay, even though my bandwidth is not very high, and to use it as my own entry point. I believe this helps my browsing be more secure.
Here's my 2nd answer:
If someone else is trying DoSing you over the Tor network there is a chance that this will be prevented from the guard relay. If not it could be an advantage for other relay operators because the traffic that flows through the network goes up to their score.
If this someone is DoSing you over the normal internet I see no chance for ...
The network page of the Tor metrics portal lists approximately 5300 relays. This number should also be known to your Tor client as every client needs a full network view. So you don't need to change your configuration.
The information about all relays is in cached-microdesc-consensus. The entries look like:
r einfo AOsaxadU+MSjQjiVx4CM7JzZ3TQ 2014-03-03 23:...
There is procedure in Tor for reporting bad relays:
Send email to address email@example.com and describe the behavior you observed (the suspicious criteria are in the wiki).
There is no automatic way of detecting such nodes, only manually.