given that BridgeAuthority relay has information of all published (non-private) bridge relays, it could be used to compromise pluggable transport, is that the case?
Yes, the bridge authority or bridgedb knows all of the published bridges.
It couldn't really be used to "compromise" pluggable transports, but if a censor was able to recover the full list, it could try to block all the IP/Port combinations but it wouldn't last into the future. There are more effective and less risky censorship methods available to serious and well-funded censors.
Some pluggable transports use a different method of censorship evasion, like
snowflake. Instead of relying on not being a known address, they use domain fronting to masquerade behind popular CDNs.
This makes it costly for censors to block them even if the location is known since it is difficult to distinguish normal CDN traffic from that of the pluggable transport and the censor cannot inspect the traffic under TLS to determine where it is really destined. Outright blocking would break a lot of users web traffic and attempts to distinguish them would result in false positives and negatives.