so I got Onion Pi from Adafruit running on my RaspberryPi2 and I can connect and everything. Problem is I'm living in China and most tor traffic is blocked by the great firewall. However, I did successfully connect using the meek-amazon transport plugin on my Ubuntu laptop.
So my question is how do I get the transport plugin to work on my Onion Pi router so I can get out of China?
Here is my torrc file
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc
Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
VirtualAddrNetwork 10.192.0.0/10
TransPort 9040
TransListenAddress 192.168.42.1
DNSListenAddress 192.168.42.1
# Only ever run as a client. Do not run as a relay or an exit.
ClientOnly
# Ensure resolution of .onion and .exit domains happen through Tor.
AutomapHostsSuffixes .onion,.exit
AutomapHostsOnResolve 1
# Serve DNS responses
DNSPort 53
# meek bridges
UseBridges 1
# With tor 0.2.4 or earlier, you have to configure the url and front on the
# command line, and you can only use one url/front combination at a time:
Bridge meek 0.0.2.0:1
# Google is blocked in China
# ClientTransportPlugin meek exec ./meek-client --url=https://meek-reflect.appspot.com/ --front=www.google.com --log meek-client.log
ClientTransportPlugin meek exec /usr/local/bin/meek-client --url=https://d2zfqthxsdq309.cloudfront.net/ --front=a0.awsstatic.com --l$
DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
PidFile /var/run/tor/tor.pid
User debian-tor
ControlSocket /var/run/tor/control
ControlSocketsGroupWritable 1
CookieAuthentication 1
CookieAuthFileGroupReadable 1
CookieAuthFile /var/run/tor/control.authcookie
Log notice file /var/log/tor/log"
## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
#SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
#SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this adddress:port too.
SocksPort 9050
## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who
## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections
## you make.
#SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
#SocksPolicy reject *
## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
## you want.
##
## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
##
## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
#Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
#Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
#Log notice syslog
## To send all messages to stderr:
#Log debug stderr
## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
RunAsDaemon 1
## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
#DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
#ControlPort 9051
## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
#CookieAuthentication 1
############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
## to tell people.
##
## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
## address y:z.
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
################ This section is just for relays #####################
#
## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.
## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
#ORPort 443
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
## yourself to make this work.
#ORPort 443 NoListen
#ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise
## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
#Address noname.example.com
## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
## outgoing traffic to use.
# OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5
## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
#Nickname ididnteditheconfig
## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
## be at least 20 KB.
## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits
## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc.
#RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
#RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps)
## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before
## hibernating.
##
## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
#AccountingMax 4 GB
## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
#AccountingStart day 00:00
## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
## is per month)
#AccountingStart month 3 15:00
## Contact info to be published in the directory, so we can contact you
## if your relay is misconfigured or something else goes wrong. Google
## indexes this, so spammers might also collect it.
#ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
#ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
## if you have enough bandwidth.
#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
## forwarding yourself to make this work.
#DirPort 80 NoListen
#DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
## distribution for a sample.
#DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html
## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address.
#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_
## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an
## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the
## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
## described in the man page or at
## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
##
## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
##
## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
## users will be told that those destinations are down.
##
## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry
## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving".
##
#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more
#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy
#ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed
## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
#BridgeRelay 1
## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
#PublishServerDescriptor 0
#Bridge obfs4 87.117.234.195:2801 EFE6C658FCCBB5466525F7BAD84C9DC1618D8947
#
# In addition to the standard tor bridge configuration, add:
#
# Use obfs4proxy to provide the obfs4 protocol.
#ServerTransportPlugin obfs4 exec /usr/bin/obfs4proxy
# Use obfs4proxy to provide the obfs4 protocol.
#ClientTransportPlugin obfs4 exec /usr/bin/obfs4proxy
#ClientTransportPlugin meek exec ./meek-client --url=http://d3dsacqprgcsqh.cloudfront.net/ --log meek-client.log
## Cloudfront server for Amazon
#d3dsacqprgcsqh.cloudfront.net 14.67%
#deayhd4nq31b0.cloudfront.net 6.06%
#d396qusza40orc.cloudfront.net 2.72%
#d3v9w2rcr4yc0o.cloudfront.net 2.26%
#d13yacurqjgara.cloudfront.net 2.09%
#dbo1rpcxmp3fw.cloudfront.net 6.83%
#d23td168vc89zo.cloudfront.net 3.82%
#d13yacurqjgara.cloudfront.net 3.72%
#d396qusza40orc.cloudfront.net 2.70%
#d3v9w2rcr4yc0o.cloudfront.net 1.35%
Log file
Apr 08 20:37:14.000 [notice] Tor 0.2.4.27 (git-412e3f7dc9c6c01a) opening new log file.
Apr 08 20:37:14.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/share/tor/geoip.
Apr 08 20:37:14.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file /usr/share/tor/geoip6.
Apr 08 20:37:19.000 [warn] The communication stream of managed proxy '/usr/local/bin/meek-client' is 'closed'. Most probably the managed proxy stopped running. This might be a bug of the managed proxy, a bug of Tor, or a misconfiguration. Please enable logging on your managed proxy and check the logs for errors.
Apr 08 20:37:19.000 [notice] Failed to terminate process with PID '3538' ('No such process').
Apr 08 20:37:20.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory server.
Apr 08 20:37:20.000 [warn] We were supposed to connect to bridge '0.0.2.0:1' using pluggable transport 'meek', but we can't find a pluggable transport proxy supporting 'meek'. This can happen if you haven't provided a ClientTransportPlugin line, or if your pluggable transport proxy stopped running.
