After configuring the Tor relay through a remote SSH session my terminal is still waiting (sort of stuck at this line on my remote SSH session ). it says:
Nov 11 10:10:00.000 [notice] Performing bandwidth self-test...done.
Question 0: But I know if I exit the terminal Tor will stop. How can I end the SSH session while I let Tor run in my remote machine?
ubuntu@ip-1XX-3X-1X-10X:~$ tor
Nov 11 10:09:46.345 [notice] Tor v0.2.5.10 (git-43a5f3d91e726291) running on Linux with Libevent 2.0.21-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.1f and Zlib 1.2.8.
Nov 11 10:09:46.345 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning
Nov 11 10:09:46.345 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".
Nov 11 10:09:46.347 [notice] Based on detected system memory, MaxMemInQueues is set to 744 MB. You can override this by setting MaxMemInQueues by hand.
Nov 11 10:09:46.348 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9050
Nov 11 10:09:46.348 [notice] Opening OR listener on 0.0.0.0:9001
Nov 11 10:09:46.000 [warn] Failed to unlink /home/ubuntu/.tor/bw_accounting: No such file or directory
Nov 11 10:09:46.000 [notice] Your Tor server's identity key fingerprint is 'Is it okay to mention it here?'
Nov 11 10:09:46.000 [notice] Configured hibernation. This interval begins at 2014-10-31 00:00:00 and ends at 2014-12-11 15:00:00. We have no prior estimate for bandwidth, so we will start out awake and hibernate when we exhaust our quota.
Nov 11 10:09:46.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/share/tor/geoip.
Nov 11 10:09:46.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file /usr/share/tor/geoip6.
Nov 11 10:09:46.000 [notice] Configured to measure statistics. Look for the *-stats files that will first be written to the data directory in 24 hours from now.
Nov 11 10:09:46.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting
Nov 11 10:09:46.000 [notice] We now have enough directory information to build circuits.
Nov 11 10:09:46.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor network
Nov 11 10:09:47.000 [notice] Guessed our IP address as 5X.XX.XX.XXX (source: 1XX.XX9.XX6.X12).
Nov 11 10:09:48.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with first hop
Nov 11 10:09:48.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit
Nov 11 10:09:50.000 [notice] Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like client functionality is working.
Nov 11 10:09:50.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 100%: Done
Nov 11 10:09:50.000 [notice] Now checking whether ORPort 54.XX.X5.XX9:9001 is reachable... (this may take up to 20 minutes -- look for log messages indicating success)
Nov 11 10:09:52.000 [notice] Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from the outside. Excellent. Publishing server descriptor.
Nov 11 10:10:00.000 [notice] Performing bandwidth self-test...done.
Therefore I edited this part in my torrc file expecting it would start after reboot and would also allow me to close the terminal after tor is called upon through SSH.
## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
RunAsDaemon 1
Question 1: Can I now simply type Tor in the terminal and close my SSH and expect Tor relay to work? Would Tor now automatically start at reboot?
Below is my new torrc file :
## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
## Last updated 9 October 2013 for Tor 0.2.5.2-alpha.
## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
##
## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
## by removing the "#" symbol.
##
## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
## for more options you can use in this file.
##
## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc
## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
#SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
#SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too.
## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who
## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections
## you make.
#SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
#SocksPolicy reject *
## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
## you want.
##
## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
##
## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
#Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
#Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
#Log notice syslog
## To send all messages to stderr:
#Log debug stderr
#Log debug stderr
## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
RunAsDaemon 1
## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
#DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
#ControlPort 9051
## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C072093276A3D70AAD684053EC4D
#CookieAuthentication 1
############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
## to tell people.
##
## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
## address y:z.
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
################ This section is just for relays #####################
#
## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.
## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
ORPort 9001
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
## yourself to make this work.
#ORPort 443 NoListen
#ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise
## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
#Address noname.example.com
## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
## outgoing traffic to use.
# OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5
## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
Nickname QwertyCoolGuy
## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
## be at least 20 KB.
## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits
## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc.
RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps)
## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before
## hibernating.
##
## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
AccountingMax 4 GB
## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
#AccountingStart day 00:00
## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
## is per month)
AccountingStart month 11 15:00
## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
ContactInfo
## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
#ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
## if you have enough bandwidth.
#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
## forwarding yourself to make this work.
#DirPort 80 NoListen
#DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
## distribution for a sample.
#DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html
## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address.
#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_
## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an
## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the
## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
## described in the man page or at
## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
##
## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
##
## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally,d e.g. by your firewall,
## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
## users will be told that those destinations are down.
## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
ContactInfo
## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
#ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
## if you have enough bandwidth.
#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
## forwarding yourself to make this work.
#DirPort 80 NoListen
#DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
## distribution for a sample.
#DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html
## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address.
#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_
## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an
## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the
## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
## described in the man page or at
## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
##
## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
##
## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
## users will be told that those destinations are down.
It is the very first time I edited this file and got it to work, so I would so much appreciate your input to the configuration file.
