Bridges exist in the Tor network to circumvent censorship by not publishing them all at the same time or as a full list. So far so good...

But how can a powerful adversary, like for example China, be prevented from learning all bridges? I read a lot about "not all bridges being published", etc. But I have a hard time to believe that this strategy really works against big players in the censorship business.

Or do I miss something?

1 Answer 1


It works, and exactly like this! To learn published bridges you need :

  1. A working Perl + some modules(email-related)
  2. A working list of emails OR a script to create ones
  3. A...Tor client(!!!) for making an online requests for bridges via email as described here.

I've made such a script and had over 50 bridges in Russia, listed by IP addresses... A beer-box task, nothing complicated.

The more people will just run Tor, the less effective per-IP blocklists will be.

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