would this break onion security? serving clearnet resources from an onion site to force visitors to go through exit nodes

Question

i read in another post "Onion services do not use exits and are end-to-end encrypted. They don't need HTTPS for its encryption and its impossible for connections to be man-in-the-middled."

I get that the onion connection itself is end to end encrypted but it can serve clearnet content, like regular http stuff - wouldn't this then cause the browser to make an independent request, cross origin request to some clearnet resource? and thus introduce using the TOR for clearnet violation? Because obviously the onion service itself wouldn't proxy through the request as this would be not scalable, and therefore each browser itself would have to make its own request.

Answer 1

It would break security for the server, but not the client.

A normal connection between a client and an onion server is two Tor chains: one from the client to the rendezvous point, and one from the server to the rendezvous point. This provides privacy for both parties: the client can't figure out who the server is, and the server can't figure out who the client is.

What you propose would eliminate the server's Tor chain. The client's privacy is still protected through the use of Tor (the connection to the server is now through an exit node rather than a rendezvous point), but the client can now figure out who the server is.