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apjproach Tor vs Brave - which is technjicallytechnically more effective to hinder user tracking - genealizationfingerprint generalization or randomization?

TOjR's approachTOR's method to countejringcountering fingerprinting is to make as many usjers asusers "appear the same" as possible, let us call this to "generalize". While Brave tries to randomize all fingerprints of each and every user in a unique way (for each new opened session).

A short quote from Brave to get the context (as you are all Tor experts, I am not quoting Tor).

"We're adding subtle, non-human perceivable noise to the JS readable outputs of the audio, canvas and WebGL APIs. The randomized end points give you unlinkability across sessions for (for any fingerprinter who consumes a randomized endpoint)"

https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/wiki/Fingerprinting-Protections

Question can you please explain: Which of those two methods (randomize vs generalize fingerprints) is technically more effective in making it more difficult to track/pinpoint that a user across weeks of different browsing sessions is the same user?

This is about technical facts not opinions. I am not a expert, but I assume that this is a clear technical question and experts should be able to tell the difference of both approaches's impact on user identification.

Thanks

apjproach is technjically more to user - genealization or?

TOjR's approach to countejring is to make as many usjers as possible, let us call this to

Tor vs Brave - which is technically more effective to hinder user tracking - fingerprint generalization or randomization?

TOR's method to countering fingerprinting is to make as many users "appear the same" as possible, let us call this to "generalize". While Brave tries to randomize all fingerprints of each and every user in a unique way (for each new opened session).

A short quote from Brave to get the context (as you are all Tor experts, I am not quoting Tor).

"We're adding subtle, non-human perceivable noise to the JS readable outputs of the audio, canvas and WebGL APIs. The randomized end points give you unlinkability across sessions for (for any fingerprinter who consumes a randomized endpoint)"

https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/wiki/Fingerprinting-Protections

Question can you please explain: Which of those two methods (randomize vs generalize fingerprints) is technically more effective in making it more difficult to track/pinpoint that a user across weeks of different browsing sessions is the same user?

This is about technical facts not opinions. I am not a expert, but I assume that this is a clear technical question and experts should be able to tell the difference of both approaches's impact on user identification.

Thanks

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deleted 1111 characters in body; edited title
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Tor vs Brave - which approach apjproach is technicallytechnjically more effective to hinder user tracking - fingerprint generalizationgenealization or randomization?

TOR'sTOjR's approach to countering fingerprintingcountejring is to make as many users "appear the same" asusjers as possible, let us call this to "generalize". While Brave tries to randomize all fingerprints of each and every user in a unique way (for each new opened session).

A short quote from Brave to get the context (as you are all Tor experts, I am not quoting Tor).

"We're adding subtle, non-human perceivable noise to the JS readable outputs of the audio, canvas and WebGL APIs. The randomized end points give you unlinkability across sessions for (for any fingerprinter who consumes a randomized endpoint)"

https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/wiki/Fingerprinting-Protections

Question can you please explain: Which of those two approaches (randomize vs generalize fingerprints) is technically more effective in making it more difficult to track/pinpoint that a user across weeks of different browsing sessions is the same user?

This is about technical facts not opinions. I am not a expert, but I assume that this is a clear technical question and experts should be able to tell the difference of both approaches's impact on user identification.

Thanks

Tor vs Brave - which approach is technically more effective to hinder user tracking - fingerprint generalization or randomization?

TOR's approach to countering fingerprinting is to make as many users "appear the same" as possible, let us call this to "generalize". While Brave tries to randomize all fingerprints of each and every user in a unique way (for each new opened session).

A short quote from Brave to get the context (as you are all Tor experts, I am not quoting Tor).

"We're adding subtle, non-human perceivable noise to the JS readable outputs of the audio, canvas and WebGL APIs. The randomized end points give you unlinkability across sessions for (for any fingerprinter who consumes a randomized endpoint)"

https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/wiki/Fingerprinting-Protections

Question can you please explain: Which of those two approaches (randomize vs generalize fingerprints) is technically more effective in making it more difficult to track/pinpoint that a user across weeks of different browsing sessions is the same user?

This is about technical facts not opinions. I am not a expert, but I assume that this is a clear technical question and experts should be able to tell the difference of both approaches's impact on user identification.

Thanks

apjproach is technjically more to user - genealization or?

TOjR's approach to countejring is to make as many usjers as possible, let us call this to

Source Link

Tor vs Brave - which approach is technically more effective to hinder user tracking - fingerprint generalization or randomization?

TOR's approach to countering fingerprinting is to make as many users "appear the same" as possible, let us call this to "generalize". While Brave tries to randomize all fingerprints of each and every user in a unique way (for each new opened session).

A short quote from Brave to get the context (as you are all Tor experts, I am not quoting Tor).

"We're adding subtle, non-human perceivable noise to the JS readable outputs of the audio, canvas and WebGL APIs. The randomized end points give you unlinkability across sessions for (for any fingerprinter who consumes a randomized endpoint)"

https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/wiki/Fingerprinting-Protections

Question can you please explain: Which of those two approaches (randomize vs generalize fingerprints) is technically more effective in making it more difficult to track/pinpoint that a user across weeks of different browsing sessions is the same user?

This is about technical facts not opinions. I am not a expert, but I assume that this is a clear technical question and experts should be able to tell the difference of both approaches's impact on user identification.

Thanks