6

The simplest (relative term) method of breaking onion routing is a correlation attack performed by a global adversary that controls a majority of nodes in the network. What that means is that somebody watching your entry and exit node can correlate requests coming in from your computer to their entry node at time n and leaving their exit node at time n1 for ...


4

To get a good understanding of the general problem, I recommend the paper Why Efficient Traffic Analysis Countermeasures Fail . It gives a good overview of why previous defence mechanisms are not sufficient. They also proposed a rather simple classifier called VNG++ which achieves good detection accuracy by only exploiting coarse features such as "total ...


4

Tor's ChangeLog provides all fixed security issues including details about the nature of the vulnerability. There isn't a single compiled list that has just the security issues, unfortunately. For the past few years we have started using CVE numbers for security issues, but since we cannot assign them ourselves this is also tricky. The bug tracker is a good ...


3

This is nothing to do with the I2P bug. They are referring to the possibility that there may be information leaks at application protocol level that may be used by an attacker to identify, fingerprint or track users, see https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorifyHOWTO#Protocolleaks: Many applications can also leak other problematic and/or ...


2

A significant threat to onion routing is a correlation attack performed by an adversary that is able to observe the start and end nodes in your connection. If somebody is watching you or your entry node, and the website you are visiting or your exit node - they can correlate the traffic. They see the website sending a large javascript file, and a few ...


2

Correct however anyone with access to the physical media need not set the administartor password to gain the equivalent of root access. From that perspective disabling the ability to ever be root would break the experience of more advanced Tails users while also not stopping an adversary with physical access to the boot media from exploiting it. Gaining ...


2

The article is mostly wrong headed, at least in how the article presents it. tl;dr - Tor Browser does a great job of making you anonymous against passive observers, it lacks against active exploitation. You should use Tor Browser but also look to isolate and/or sandbox Tor Browser. Tor Browser doesn't currently have any publicly known vulnerabilities, that ...


1

Well, first of all - there's NO unbreakable things in this world, everything can be cracked - it's just a question of resources applied and the time it consume. So - if something is not cracked yet, it only means that nowdays it's too laborious and long to do this. To crack Tor an attacker need to crack in real time AES cryptography and then triple-use it to ...


1

Tor doesn't use DNS. Any DNS resolving is done at the exit node by the exit node, Tor Browser users are unaffected. It might affect some exit nodes who haven't patched.


1

Interesting article. I don't know what the exact vulnerabilities are they talk about. But, yes, Tor Browser like any other software, has vulnerabilities. I'm not aware of any other browser that is designed to protect your privacy as thoroughly as Tor Browser. Take a look at the design document to see for yourself what is needed to get a reasonably private ...


1

Quick synopsis This is oldish research that was presented about a year ago by Filippo Valsorda and George Tankersley at HITB. Sophos are an anti-virus company. They have a product to sell and the person who wrote the article clearly doesn't know what they're talking about, for example... "recently revealed a new vulnerability" is false in that it wasn't ...


1

Based on the information available so far, none at all. The Equation Group's known malware targets only Windows-based systems; there's some indication of MacOSX support, but no actual malware has been found.


1

Tor does not hide the fact that you use Tor. Your IP is hidden from the final destination and from the exit. Your destination and traffic are hidden from the guard and from your ISP. Even without (re)connecting through different network paths, the Entry Guard knows where the connection is coming from, but can not read the traffic and does not know where ...


1

The issue was fixed in Tails 1.0.1.


1

('How vulnerable' is a bit tricky, as there is no unit or scale.) Assuming that the Bad Guy can see all internet traffic, owning relays does not help much for timing correlation attacks. You're always vulnerable to those, no matter who owns which relays or how many. (Generally, more relays and more traffic make it easier to hide.) Besides timing, which is ...


1

I believe that it's possible to prevent fingerprinting by browsing on a remote desktop, rather than directly on a local machine. The signatures for client-website traffic and local-remote RDP traffic would be poorly correlated at best. First rent a hosted physical server, with at least 2 GB RAM, running Debian or Ubuntu (server, no GUI). If possible, using ...


1

Doesn't the first server see who I am? Possibly. A bad first of three servers can see encrypted Tor traffic coming from your computer. It still doesn't know who you are and what you are doing over Tor. It merely sees "This IP address is using Tor". Tor is not illegal anywhere in the world, so using Tor by itself is fine. You are still protected ...


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