11

Your question is quite hard to answer, because as far as I know the special capabilities of the agencies in this field are yet unknown. However you can first look into Tor's design document. Section 3.1 states: A global passive adversary is the most commonly assumed threat when analyzing theoretical anonymity designs. But like all practical low-latency ...


9

First, you have to distinguish between Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and actual traffic analysis. DPI only looks at packet payload whereas traffic analysis looks at everything other than payload, e.g., packet lengths, bursts and timing. It is well known that DPI can be used to detect Tor flows. Several countries such as China, Iran and Syria are doing that ...


7

In addition to Jens' answer, from the front page of Tor project website: For most uses, Tor provides the best available protection against a well-resourced observer. It's an open question how much protection Tor (or any other existing anonymous communications tool) provides against the NSA's large-scale Internet surveillance. On its own, Tor can't ...


6

SMTP can perform well over a hidden service, in fact there are providers that offer such a thing. SMTP, IMAP and POP, the email protocols are TCP based and since Tor offers a base for TCP connections, every TCP based protocol can operate on top of it. Using SMTP over Tor could anonymize some valuable identity information in email's headers, but email headers ...


5

Johannes Berg experimented with configuring the Exim MTA to send mail to .onion addresses, and has written a whitepaper on the subject; see http://johannes.sipsolutions.net/Projects/exim-tor-hidden-mail.


3

Is my anonymity at risk by not using HTTPS? Yes; and any information you are sending should be considered compromised. HTTPS (HTTP over TLS/SSL, or HTTP Secure) encrypts the data traveling between your computer and the webserver. Even if you consider your communication being secure between your computer and the exit node, your data will be sent in the clear ...


3

Could you send an email from me@abcdefg.onion to you@hijklmnop.onion using standard mail programs and hidden services / transparent proxy? Yes it could, but it wouldn't be with a standard Tor. (Unless some extra software was put in the middle of some of the connections somewhere.) Right now Tor's transparent proxy's DNS server returns NOTIMPL for MX queries....


2

What I think was happening was that Tor prevented my IP from being tracked by my ISP and managed to limit my download speed. Generally Tor nodes are public, so it would be a matter of time before an ISP figure out you are using Tor and decide to speed limit that if they wish to do so. I download Tor to avoid government restrictions about a website, and ...


1

Can the ISP provider know that we are running tails? A careful network observer could make a good guess that you were using Tails, by observing network connection behaviour which is (more or less) unique to Tails and making an educated guess. This is covered in the Tails Documentation. As we have bridges in tor-browser is there something like this in ...


1

No, there's no such implicatioons at all. If the bridge is compromised or accessed without a key - it does not matter where it is.


1

Define safe. If you're worried about your boss being able to see what you're doing in Tor, then yes, Tor will be safe. Your Tor traffic will still be intercepted by your boss, but since the connection from you to the Tor network is triple-encrypted, your boss will only see a bunch of encrypted data going from you to whichever guard relay you're connected to....


1

('How vulnerable' is a bit tricky, as there is no unit or scale.) Assuming that the Bad Guy can see all internet traffic, owning relays does not help much for timing correlation attacks. You're always vulnerable to those, no matter who owns which relays or how many. (Generally, more relays and more traffic make it easier to hide.) Besides timing, which is ...


1

Yes it is possible to run a full open source email stack (postfix + dovecot + roundcube + ...) as a Tor hidden service and use it with Tor Browser Bundle (the webmail) and also with torsocks + claws-mail. Additionally, postfix can be tweaked to strip privacy related headers from outgoing emails. We deploy such configurations and do extensive packet sniffing ...


1

Using multiple gateway VMs (pfSense for openvpn and OpenWRT for Tor) and accounts with multiple VPN privacy services, it's possible to route one VPN tunnel through another, and route Tor through an arbitrarily-complex nested chain of VPN tunnels. Using such setups, it's easy to add cover traffic to obscure Tor traffic. For example, you might only use Tor ...


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