3

Unless you edit your tor configuration (your torrc file) to add an onion service, tor won't run any onion services and no one will be able to connect to any of your local servers, so you're safe. Even if you accidentally set up a v3 onion service, anyone who wishes to connect to your service would need to know the full 32-byte public identity key of the ...


3

It's not enabled by default because it would block a significant fraction of the Internet for users. Blocking HTTP-only traffic will likely come in the future once Tor Browser is using a version of Firefox with HTTPS-only mode, and once the developers feel they can do it while minimizing the usability impact (for example providing documentation to explain ...


1

It is possible, but highly unlikely. No matter what steps are taken, true anonymity is never possible. If someone was running an illegal business, the authorities would eventually find them and arrest them. Nobody is ever completely anonymous and can be identified if there was enough effort into doing so. It takes just one vulnerability in an illegal ...


1

HTTPS Everywhere does not block all non-https requests since it would block a significant fraction of the Internet for users, hurting usability. Instead, it uses a ruleset to only modify requests for specific domains. You can search the list here: https://atlas.eff.org/index.html. Note that uniquemachine.org is not in the list, so the HTTPS Everywhere ...


1

The Tor Browser developers have designed the Tor Browser to not leak your identity in its default configuration, and you should not need to change any settings. If there are features that can reveal your IP address with Tor's default settings, you should inform the developers. The option media.peerconnection.enabled that you mentioned is already disabled in ...


1

Right, Tor cannot protect against an adversary that runs a significant fraction of the network. This is true for any anonymity network, and is why it's important for other people with good intentions to run relays. In fact there are timing-based attacks where an adversary only needs to control a user's entry and exit relays, and not the middle. This is why ...


1

These types of attacks aren't possible in Tor because of Tor's ntor handshake and Tor's authenticated directory documents generated by the directory authorities. Tor clients download a trusted (and signed) list of all relays generated by Tor's directory authorities. This list of relays is part of the network consensus document. Each relay in this list also ...


1

What would be the issue? Logically, there are three possible answers: Facebook incorrectly recorded your logins. This seems unlikely; I am not aware of any reports of this. Facebook detected one of your logins as coming from Portugal, despite you not being in Portugal. This was addressed by cacahuatl’s answer: the most likely answer is that you logged in ...


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