hiprivet provided a solution by changing the source code of Tor. The question, if it is possible to extent the circuit length, was asked before and this answer is still valid.
So take a minute before you implement this solution and consider the following issues:
The main risk of a Tor circuit are the end points. First there is the entry into the Tor ...
If we try to represent circuits as table, where:
A letter C is a client
A letter D is a destination
A letter N is a node
A number after letter N is number of node
A compromised node placed into square brackets
A not compromised node placed into round brackets
Attacker have a control of a half of all nodes
Then we can see something like that:
Think that it is a dirty solution. But I've tried to apply this code
routelen = (rand() % 6 + 1);
log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Now routelen equals %d", routelen);
to this function, before routelen variable returns, then compiled it.
And my output looks like it:
[notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
[notice] Parsing GEOIP ...