Tor Browser 3.5+ series based on Firefox ESR 24, it shipped without this switch.
The Tor Browser Bundle includes noscript, but by default it is configured to allow scripts.
You can configure it yourself to disallow scripts, but you should be aware that if you start whitelisting sites, your whitelist can be used as a sort of user fingerprint.
Scripts should not be able to get your real IP address in the TBB. If they can, that would be ...
There is already a patch in Tor Browser that mitigates some of the worst risks with this way to ...
I found a way to do that on linux:
apt-get install tor
download Multi-TOR from here: https://github.com/jseidl/Multi-TOR
run ./multi-tor.sh 10 for 10 socks ports (for example)
You can use selenium or splinter python (for example) and import socks port
put the script on a while or for statement as u wish
from pyvirtualdisplay import Display
It looks like it attempts to learn your IP address via a WebRTC connection. That this is possible was reported a while ago, but it never affected TorBrowser users as WebRTC is disabled in TorBrowser. So, the js is not dangerous if you use Tor in the recommended way. If you don't, it is rather likely it'll leak your real IP address.
When you are using Flash (swf files), you are letting the door to your anonymity wide open. Flash can see your IP address and reveal it to the hosting site, thus de-anonymizing you.
Furthermore, consider using an open-source browser such as Firefox or TorBrowser. They are safer than closed-source browsers such as Google Chrome, and they don't have a ...
Or as it seems from the question and it is not browser based issue, try different relay / bridges if it is really related to the fact you are using Tor.
I've tested this on both a hosted installation, and a wordpress.com site.
The hosted installation works as it should. There's no need to turn off Noscript. Everything under http://foobar.com/wp-admin/ is accessible.
However, even ...
I want to monitor a website without making it a priori evident that it is being monitored
The set of exits isn't (very) large, you'll repeat after a given time scale.
The exits are weighted, you're more likely to use high capacity ones.
The timing and uniformity of the HTTP requests.
The (likely) quite unique user-agent and chosen set of headers ...
Thanks for the suggestion, hawkeye. I tried all the options on the Appearance tab and none of them produced the desired result.
However, if I check the "Temporarily allow [...]" box on the Appearance tab AND ALSO uncheck "Cascade top document's permissions to 3rd party scripts" on the Advanced, Trusted tab, then NoScript starts listing all domains that ...
It makes it far more likely that a site owner will be able to track you.
There are also risks from bugs in the Tor browser..
If you want to stay safe using Tor, avoid 2 things:
exchanging any activities, files, disk devices etc. between Tor and non-Tor
having anything persistent across Tor sessions - eg. bookmarklets
Both of these increase the chance of rogue forces (NSA etc.) to deanonymize you using any correlation and/or watermarking attack.
How to avoid that?
If you know and understand what the bookmarklet you use does and know the privacy implications by using this you are probably not adding specific risk.
Since you send information to pinboard.in you are however replacing anonymity with pseudonymity. This means that it might be easier for this service to reveal your identity either by doing something like ...
The risk for using a link like that for that service is not something i would worry about.
There is bigger risk for other types of exploits then what this link could do.
The current version of Tor Browser Bundle has the NoScript icon on the top left of the page: