Error 403 and CAPTCHA are appearing because the exit node you're using is not dedicated to you only: Many people are using it, including to access Google and other services.
It seems - on a website server's side - that one single IP address (the exit node) generates too many requests per time and a different requests/user sessions, so it can interpret it as ...
Regarding the question "Can you be arrested?", yes, you can be arrested all the time. In most countries you can be arrested for looking funny at a police officer. In most countries you will also be released as soon as they have no reason to suspect you anymore. Interesting questions would be would a prosecutor charge you and would those charges hold up in a ...
The difference between .onion URLs and normal URLs, is that the normal URL is simply a "human readable pointer" points to a network location... on the other hand, a .onion URL is actually the only address you should be accessing it from. The secure part about Tor is that it masks the server IPs as well.
A government or "knowledgable individual" can tell ...
This setup may, or may not, be completely anonymous, depending on a whole bunch of factors, some extremely subtle. Adding a VPN to Tor basically never improves anonymity, though. Exactly how someone would trace you back to your real IP is in many cases more about how you use Tor, than Tor itself.
No, correctly-configured Tor hidden services are not accessible by direct IP connection. When setting up a hidden service, you set up your web server to only listen to traffic from the local machine, which will come from the Tor client:
You need to configure your web server so it doesn't give away any information about you, your computer, or your location....
The concern you're rising here is "will it be able to detect a clearnet address of a darknet server" - so it's must be protected by firewall. And the most effective technique here is to separate the service in a VM/LXC and make it not routed to the clearnet or run a service under a specific username and prohibit any clearnet activites for this username. It's ...
If you were using the Tor Browser in the recommended way, then there's nothing to worry about; your real IP address won't have been exposed, and the site could only have seen the IP address of the exit node. The fact that the site blocked access means you didn't get as far as doing anything that might have made you traceable, like logging in with your ...
Tor is likely not the solution you're looking for, as most services that do geolocation to block users not in a certain country block anonymizers.
Tor doesn't hide your IP address completely, Tor makes it appear that your IP address is that of the Tor exit node. This means that the service you're trying to access will also see the IP address of the Tor node....
You'd need to run two Tor instances, one for the published relay and the other for the bridge.
The important part will be in specifying the correct IP address to bind to and listen on for the obfs4proxy and orports.
Assuming you had two IP addresses with 188.8.131.52 being your relay and 184.108.40.206 being your bridge, your config would look something like this
You can't. If you want to stay anonymous, you cannot send an email through Gmail as you will lose your anonymity. One of the main things not to do while using Tor is to use Google services since your emails are not private and can easily be read and traced. No email service is completely anonymous though there are certain email services which are more ...
If you want to stay anonymous, you need to think about every step when using your mail provider.
Registering your account
Accessing your mail account
Reading your mails
Writing your mails
You have to assume that your mail provider saves every step you do in your account. This seems especially true for GMail, but also it is also true for others.
So when you ...
What you say is true. This attack exists. If all the nodes are controlled by an attacker such an attack works.
However Tor is designed to make it somewhat hard for one attacker to control all the nodes and really target and individual users.
It also explains why your client chooses and keeps an entry guard. Entry guards, entry points, so the first hops is ...
It looks like it attempts to learn your IP address via a WebRTC connection. That this is possible was reported a while ago, but it never affected TorBrowser users as WebRTC is disabled in TorBrowser. So, the js is not dangerous if you use Tor in the recommended way. If you don't, it is rather likely it'll leak your real IP address.
Many websites block Tor exit nodes because of abuse. The most likely explanation seems that logging in from Tor is blocked as well.
You could try a VPN or an open proxy to see if you're able to access the site using these. Beware though: these don't offer the same level of anonymity protection as Tor, or perhaps none at all.
You could also try a web proxy (...
From https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/rend-spec.txt, section 0.2:
Bob->Bob's OP: "Offer IP:Port as public-key-name:Port". [configuration]
(We do not specify this step; it is left to the implementor of
Bob's OP generates a long-term keypair.
Bob's OP->Introduction point via Tor: [introduction setup]
All other countries are working...
According to https://compass.torproject.org, there are no exit relays in Greece, so you can't get a Greek IP through Tor.
Is there anything I can do?
Like canonizing ironize said, you can run an exit node in Greece, get a VPN in Greece, or ask someone else to set one up for you in Greece.
When using Tor, the server should only see the IP from the Tor exit node.
However, your IP could still be leaked in various ways, such as using the same account with and without Tor, using plug-ins such as Flash Player, and so on.
This page has a good overview of how Tor works: https://www.torproject.org/about/overview
I want to monitor a website without making it a priori evident that it is being monitored
The set of exits isn't (very) large, you'll repeat after a given time scale.
The exits are weighted, you're more likely to use high capacity ones.
The timing and uniformity of the HTTP requests.
The (likely) quite unique user-agent and chosen set of headers ...
Generally all extensions are bad. If they affect how the browser behaves they are fingerprintable and therefor reduce your anonymity because your browser no longer acts like other peoples.
Firstly, most of these addons work by blacklisting which is always insufficient and flawed. Infact a study of such addons found there were cases that it always missed and ...
Yes, if it's listening on an external interface then you would be able to visit the IP and talk to the service.
For this reason, you should make services you wish to be anonymous bind to the local loopback interface, or a unix socket to avoid them being deanonymized by attackers running zmap/masscan.
If some client or server is running some service over ...
Tor clients keep a pool of circuits and may use several circuits simultaneously for streams depending on factors such as exit policies, stream isolation, etc. So there is generally not a single "in-use" circuit. And it's not quite true that a circuit is used for only a max of 10 minutes. Generally a circuit is marked as "dirty" (unusable ...
No one can make a 100% guarantee of these things, and generally speaking the question "Is x secure?" or "Is x safe?" is only even meaningful in the context of "...against y".
If programs use Tor incorrectly and don't respect your privacy or weren't designed for anonymity, they may reveal both your IP and information about your device.
Use only trustworthy ...
There are ways to do this but since this would totally break many of Tor's protections and stop you being anonymous, I will not help you shoot yourself in the foot.
Read the manual: https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en
If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat the ExcludeNodes option as a requirement to follow for all the circuits you generate, even if doing so will break functionality for you. If StrictNodes is set to 0, Tor will still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list, but it will err on the side of avoiding unexpected errors. ...
Your logic is not okay so far.
Here are some links you might find useful:
A call to arms: Helping Internet services accept anonymous users
The Trouble with CloudFlare
Ultimately there is no technical solution to the problem that does not compromise your anonymity. Exit points being known protects the people who operate them (e.g. Exonerator).
Let me first make a remark: you should avoid to roll you own crypto. :-)
Instead of giving the encryption software, two people could physically exchange the keys used for the encryption. However, that would be very cumbersome, and we found a way to properly exchange these keys on an untrusted network. You can take a look at this question about how could ...
but i can't connect to a specific IP address from this Tor list
That is not a list of web servers / web sites. It is a list of relays.
Your client will automatically pick 3 of those to make a circuit.
You can browse the normal web anonymously with your Tor browser.
If you're looking for .onion sites, see this question.