No, the HS directory is accessed via Tor. See: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/rend-spec.txt#n549
The nodes running HS directories do form a distributed hash table, though it's not decentralized the same way that Freenet is, since all of the HS directory nodes are listed in the Tor consensus. So the client identifies which HSDir node is ...
No, .onion's are not exempt from DNS leaks.
Since it's possible for people to run local DNS gTLDs, DNS infrastructure will generally respect and dutifully perform lookups for invalid domain names. DNS itself is agnostic to the gTLD being valid or not, with a few exceptions (for example .invalid should always fail).
There is an RFC covering .onion which ...
If you want to stay anonymous, you need to think about every step when using your mail provider.
Registering your account
Accessing your mail account
Reading your mails
Writing your mails
You have to assume that your mail provider saves every step you do in your account. This seems especially true for GMail, but also it is also true for others.
So when you ...
You can't. If you want to stay anonymous, you cannot send an email through Gmail as you will lose your anonymity. One of the main things not to do while using Tor is to use Google services since your emails are not private and can easily be read and traced. No email service is completely anonymous though there are certain email services which are more ...
It looks like it attempts to learn your IP address via a WebRTC connection. That this is possible was reported a while ago, but it never affected TorBrowser users as WebRTC is disabled in TorBrowser. So, the js is not dangerous if you use Tor in the recommended way. If you don't, it is rather likely it'll leak your real IP address.
Tor is saying that a program did not use DNS through Tor and instead used DNS through your clearnet IP address. While the DNS server, and those that saw your connection to the DNS server, do not know what you did on the website you connected to, provided there was an encrypted connection to the site. They may be able to figure out what you did on the visited ...
Related question: How can I test an application for proxy leaks? (duplicate?)
Viewing the traffic can tell you if they have leaked, nothing short of thorough code review can tell you if it ever will leak. The fact that nothing has gone wrong should not be taken as an indication that nothing will go wrong. For example, you might find that there are weird ...
I do recommend to use an anonymizing routing box and make a tcpdump running on it's internal interface where your device/PC is connected. Every leak will be hard routed to/through Tor via firewall or local DNS server, but you will see what leaks and where to. I'm using this method when evaluating mobile devices
An answer is simple: use a second HS! You're using a second HS as a proxy or OpenVPN server for the very deep HS of yours. And no problem will be regarding the privacy/location/deanonymization of your first HS
This post on Reddit: https://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/8x7dwj/why_public_wifi/ is a good source to answer this question. As one Reddit use stated, if your Internet Service Provider can see you are using Tor (assuming you directly connecting to the guard node) and is also the Internet Service Provider of the connection endpoint like the website (which is ...
JS running in web browsers cannot run arbitrary commands on the host machine — that would be an extreme security violation.
Pretty much every method of finding a client's IP address you'll find in online tutorials, such as this one, rely entirely on processing XHR requests to third-...
DO NOT USE A VPN WITH TOR
This has been documented to be a very bad idea. The VPN will track everything you do, and destroy your anonymity.
Just connect directly to Tor, and if needed to access Tor, use bridges
Android devices do ignore DHCP DNS server, remember. So - it looks like this? I've met this problem too. The only really working workaround is to forcibly route all dns requests to 220.127.116.11 and 18.104.22.168 to the port 9053 in yor case - and block the IP addresses of 22.214.171.124 and 126.96.36.199 to be routed through Tor, I've found no other way
Short answer: If you're sure you understand and accept the fingerprinting risks, then yes, it's fine to use regular Firefox (or any application) in an AppVM connected to a Whonix-Gateway.
It sounds like you may be conflating Qubes OS with Qubes-Whonix. Qubes OS can run many different types of VMs in addition to Whonix-based VMs.
So, the ...
It gets your location from nearby wireless network names (ssid).
The "How does it work" section on https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/geolocation/ explains it:
How does it work?
When you visit a location-aware website, Firefox will ask you if you
want to share your location.
If you consent, Firefox gathers information about nearby wireless
You could capture the traffic with a tool like WireShark.
If it logs a direct connect to the used URL then the app is not using the Tor Socks Proxy.
torify is maybe also an alternative for you, it easily tunnels the network traffic through tor without having to configure the app you want to execute. A tutorial can be found here