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Well, running nyx as Tor user (it's named mostly as tor or debian-tor in a packaged binaries) has it's uses, but only if you're using a unix socket for a Control Protocol. The truth is that the Tor control protocol does not provide a fully-featured authentication system with all the necessary protections like brute force defense et cetera. So, if you're ...


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You need NGinX - or another appropriate to your service - server bound to your localhost and a socket listener rule for the very addressed you need, no proxy is needed as well


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I was unable to make this work using socat but I did find a nice new Golang proxy that worked without any issue: https://github.com/willscott/onionproxy.


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Tor uses TCP tunnels, so - regardless of the previous answer - no need to use it. The hidden service is reached from the Tor node that is hosting it, usually through a localhost. The scenario you've described about IP revealing - yes, it can be a privacy problem. The design doc states clear - the system is anonymizing mostly the client, not the server - it's ...


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Well, for this task I used to have this setup and it proved itself to be bulletproof: You have your onion site - either balanced by OnionBalance or not - on your servers. If you do have a balanced setup - repeat it for every node You arise a separated Tor instances with the bridge server on really static IP's You connect your site instances to your bridges


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Basically - no: the way you're accessing them is decentralized, but the sites are quite centralized to the very HS server serving them.


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It's decentralized in significantly different fashion than .crypto domain. In blockchain-backed domain system you can claim any name not claimed by anyone else. In .onion all you can do is to generate new private key that maps to SOME domain name (hash of your key). Period. Unless nobody else knows your private key, nobody else can publish hidden-service on ...


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