Yes - the surrounding details about this are desribed in the [General FAQ][1]

> # You should hide the list of Tor relays, so people can't block the exits. 
>There are a few reasons we don't:
> 
>  - We can't help but make the information available, since Tor clients need to use it to pick their paths. So if the "blockers" want it, they
> can get it anyway. Further, even if we didn't tell clients about the
> list of relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of
> connections through Tor to a test site and build a list of the
> addresses they see.
>  - If people want to block us, we believe that they should be allowed to do so. Obviously, we would prefer for everybody to allow Tor users
> to connect to them, but people have the right to decide who their
> services should allow connections from, and if they want to block
> anonymous users, they can.
>  - Being blockable also has tactical advantages: it may be a persuasive response to website maintainers who feel threatened by Tor.
> Giving them the option may inspire them to stop and think about
> whether they really want to eliminate private access to their system,
> and if not, what other options they might have. The time they might
> otherwise have spent blocking Tor, they may instead spend rethinking
> their overall approach to privacy and anonymity.

  [1]: https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#HideExits