Let's suppose that I am using Tor and I open another page in Firefox at the same time.

  • Will it compromise my anonymity?
  • A little of topic but good to know: If you suspect other applications might be de-anonymizing you, use Qubes OS. This OS increases security by compartmentalization or isolation and it is optimized to run multiple VMs. You can run each application or a group of it in one isolated VM and other application(s) in another isolated VM. So that applications in different VMs will not be able spy or tamper with each other. Commented Sep 7, 2016 at 9:39

2 Answers 2


Actually it can compromise you, if you're using a browser with WebRTC enabled, and the page you're opening has the same tracking code - via WebRTC some leaks are theoretically possible. That's actually why WebRTC is disabled in Tor Browser Bundle



Technically speaking, a Tor site won't know you opened that connection on clearnet and the clearnet site won't be able to tell whether you're using Tor (your ISP can, though). Also you won't have your Tor identity revealed. In theory.

However ...

... there's the big problem that you're a human. Humans make errors. If some APT (advanced persistent thread, for example the NSA) or a malicious entity is watching your network it may be possible to trace what you do in Tor and reveal your identity.

There are several ways this could be done:

  • If you do something on the Tor (for example typing a text on a malicious hidden service) and sometimes stop to do something in clearnet one can correlate that this Tor identity is probably you.
  • If you're reading something on a Tor page and look up something you found there in clearnet its another big hint at you.
  • Humans do errors. Try to opening an address which you don't want to be known in your clearnet browser and its obvious you're using Tor. Bonus point if you open it next in the Tor browser to fully reveal your Tor identity.
  • Even if you're running Tor fully virtualized, if your VM is compromised a malicious clearnet page could create for example very specific CPU load patterns which the VM can identify revealing your identity.

Now most of these are worst case scenarios, most malicious entities won't be able to fully watch your traffic. Also it's really hard to track your Tor identity.


Coming to a conclusion, it doesn't spoil your identity per-se. But it increases your chances to be revealed by error or wrong behaviour. If you don't do something highly illegal, you're probably safe from this advanced tracking but if you want or need need to stay save in every case, do not do this.

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