I am trying to understand what are possibilities of adversary running his own HSDir and few relays?
- Adversary cannot retrieve all the .onion addresses? Only the ones advertised on his HSDir? Are HSDirs that are advertising specific .onion addresses rotating over some time?
- Adversary can see how many connection attempts were made to specific .onion address?
- If adversary controls entry node(guard relay) and HSDir on the client side. He is able to retrieve the users IP by traffic correlation attack?
- If adversary controls entry node and HSDIR on hidden service side he can deanonymize location of hidden service?
Slide 49 says:
"You can trust an HSDir you run yourself."
"Free detection: you will notice if someone competes with you for the HSDir positions"
These two quotes got me confused...
As a countermeasure client and person running hidden service can set their entry nodes or bridges also.
Adversary is than only in possibility (using positioning attack mentioned in slides) to see number of connection attempts but cannot deanonymize users or person running hidden-service.