Orbot, Tor identities and changing network connectivity paths

Question

I've been thinking about a potential vulnerability that in certain cases may make it possible to identify a Tor client.

Say a malicious entry node establishes a connection with an Orbot client. This client proceeds to connect to the entry node through different network paths (wifi access points, mobile carriers) as the user moves in space. Through the pattern of hostnames/IPs connecting to the entry node, it may in extreme cases be possible to detect the identity of the user.

The way I see it, it could be resolved by automatically switching to a new Tor identity when Orbot detects network connectivity changes.

Thoughts or comments?

Answer 1

Tor does not hide the fact that you use Tor.

Your IP is hidden from the final destination and from the exit. Your destination and traffic are hidden from the guard and from your ISP.

Even without (re)connecting through different network paths, the Entry Guard knows where the connection is coming from, but can not read the traffic and does not know where the circuit will exit from/to. The Exit node knows where you connect to and can see (unencrypted) traffic but does not know who/where the client is.