After setting up my own Nextcloud server over tor, using a private
.onion domain, and http, I am unsure about the security implications of using http in this setup.
I learned one can buy a
.onion https certificate at digicert, and I expect one may be able to use a self-signed certificate. However, I would like to minimize costs, and I have not yet been able to make self-signed certificates work in practice.
To limit the scope of the question, I make the following assumptions:
- Malicious actors can see the outgoing traffic towards tor, over wifi.
- A malicious tor-exit node can see the un-encrypted http data that is submitted into the
.oniondomain, upon loggin in via
- The malicious tor-exit node does not need to know where my nextcloud server is located, if they can intercept my username and password that is submitted over tor over http, as they can re-use them over tor, on the same
I am not sure whether it would be the exit node that presents me the
.onion site and login, or whether it is the "input node" to which my server connects that needs to be compromised for an adversary to intercept my login credentials. (Or both, or either of the two).
Can malicious actors, and/or malicous tor-node operators directly read the Nextcloud password and username that I submit over
http://some_onion_domain.onion, or do they require an additional vulnerability/exploit/majority to actually read the passwords?
And if yes, are malicous actors monitoring my wifi able to do so, or only malicious tor-node operators, or both, or also some other actors outside the tor-network?
Update: self-signed SSL cert
In the meantime, this script was written that creates a self-signed certificate. Note, I am involved in writing that script.