We known that an adversary can deanonymize a user (on clearnet) if it controls both the guard and the exit node. But is that neccesary? We know that the NSA gets huge amounts of data from the internet. What stops them from having all the Tor nodes data from all the European, American ISPs without owning the nodes? So if I connect to the guard node, the NSA gets the ISP data and sees that my IP connects to that node and that node sends data to an other relay. The NSA sees the ISP data of the middle relay and does the same as before. Then in the exit node the third ISP sees that it connects to a website and the NSA sees that. So the have deanonymized me, without controlling any of the nodes.
What stops the NSA from requesting data from foreign and Local ISPs for Tor nodes and thus deanonymizing every single user? Most nodes are in Europe (US friendly), US, Canada (US friendly) and Latin America (which may cooperate).