Does changing every normal relay to bridge relay make tor better,? because they provide more anonymity, except exit nodes to help them incase of Abuse reports, other issues... Etc
Your Isp can block connections to all known tor relays but they they can't block every bridge relay,bridge relays are better?
running a bridge relay is actually better in every circumstance, it has its benefits no disbenefits, so it should be a default recommendation?
No, this would not make Tor any better. This is why.
A bridge relay is your guard entry to the Tor network. What happens after that node is not your concern. Even if your country blocks all relay nodes the bridge takes you outside the country and from there on it has no problem connecting to other relays. As long as not the entire world is blocking Tor nodes it won't be needed to hide all nodes.
Your client is the one creating the routes. When your client creates a route (and thus selecting a guard, middle and exit node) it retrieves a list of nodes from the directory service. If all of those nodes would be bridges then by default you would need a large list of bridges to create an anonymous route. If all clients would retrieve a large list of bridges then it won't take long for an attacker to get a list of ALL bridges making them absolutely useless.
Bridges have dis-benefits. They don't have a family parameter so the same family could be running your entire route. Your anonymity could be at stake. They also cannot run a hidden service directory which means that running anonymous websites on Tor would stop functioning.
So no, making all nodes bridges is not better. It would destroy the Tor network as we know it.
It does not make Tor better per say. If you live under certain conditions, running a bridge relay is a better option for you. It is not a default recommendation however.
More info at: https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq#RelayOrBridge
No, making every relay a bridge would not be better.
In order to setup a circuit (a connection from a client to an exit node or onion service), the client needs to be able to pick all the nodes in the path. The client can only pick nodes that it knows about (can't pick something you don't know exists). The whole point of bridges is that they're not published to everyone, so each client only get a small subset of the total list of bridges. Thus, each client would only have a few relays to choose from, which would make it easier for an adversary to attack the client's whole path and deanonymise the communication.
If your ISP blocks connections to all known tor relays, then yes, you'll want to use a bridge, but only as the entrypoint into the Tor network. Once you've contacted your bridge, you can still use normal relays as additional nodes in your circuits, because your ISP doesn't know that you're using the other tor relays (the connection to those relays doesn't come from your local machine, it comes from the bridge.
