The Tor Browser bounces your communications data through distributed network of relays by encrypting traffic in at least three layers selected from thousands of volunteer computers, thus making incredibly difficult for anyone to trace you and your activity and identity that has been masked by Tor.
Tor functions like a layered series of proxy servers that route your traffic in a zig-zag around the internet before it reaches your destination (the layers give rise to the name, which stands for The Onion Router).
There are at least three hops through data travels.
The entry node, which inevitably knows your IP address The middle (or relay) node, which prevents the exit node from finding out which entry node you used and makes it very hard to correlate this information The exit node, which knows what site you are connecting to, but does not know who you are
What if a malicious Tor node may keep limited logs and that parts of it may be under surveillance.
But since it’s not completely secure, because they previously had to rely on exit nodes. Since Exit nodes can also see your traffic and may attempt to modify it. But unfortunately it’s unlikely that resources will be spent tracking down your browsing habits running on a high-profile user and these exit node bandwidth is the scarcest resource in the Tor ecosystem.
What measures should be taken in-order to avoid the above circumstances. What must be the additional softwares needed to be installed to combat against privacy?
How do we need to configure those Exit nodes? Does Onion Service really defend against the above scenario?