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Simple question. Doesn't the way Tor works make a de-anonymization more likely the longer you use/run Tor?

From my understanding, you are fully de-anonymized when X controls both Entry Guard Node and Exit Node.

With the way Tor works, you are tied to a fixed Entry Guard for quite a reasonable time. If you are unlucky, you might get connected to a bad Entry Guard Node owned by X. From now on, it is only a matter of time until you are randomly connected to a bad Exit Node, also in control of X. This is due to Tor keeping the Entry Guard stable for a reasonable time but very frequently changes the Middle- and Exit Node.

Did I made any error in my thinking? If not, unluckily beeing connected to a bad Entry Guard Node would just need a certain amount of time until Tor randomly connects you to the bad Exit Node belonging to the malicious Entry Guard Node.

I hope someone can clarify.

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    Yes you’re correct in the case where you choose a malicious guard node, but the Tor people have chosen this design for a few reasons. You can read more information about this exact problem here: blog.torproject.org/…
    – Steve
    Feb 9, 2019 at 18:05
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    Thank you for your answer. That of course is a huge downside. But that also comes with a huge upside. Wouldn't it make a lot of sense to exclude the Exit Node being from the same country as the Entry Guard Node? This would drastically reduce the chance of beeing de-anonymized
    – PomBa76
    Feb 9, 2019 at 19:51
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    @Steve an answer (to upvote and accept) would be awesome.
    – DJCrashdummy
    Feb 10, 2019 at 8:17
  • @PomBa76 linking your follow-up question would make sense. and also linking this one in your new question wouldn't hurt either. ;-)
    – DJCrashdummy
    Feb 10, 2019 at 9:04

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