It's possible but relays won't do it.
Tor uses "relay early" cell, which is used to prevent people from building very long paths in the Tor network. Very long paths can be used to induce congestion and aid in breaking anonymity.
It has been addressed in this proposal avoid-infinite-circuits
An attacker can add load to the Tor network by extending a
circuit an arbitrary number of times. Every cell that goes down the
circuit then adds N times that amount of load in overall bandwidth
use. This vulnerability arises because servers don't know their position
on the path, so they can't tell how many nodes there are before them
on the path.
We propose a new set of relay cells that are distinguishable by
intermediate hops as permitting extend cells. This approach will allow
us to put an upper bound on circuit length relative to the number of
colluding adversary nodes.
Only K (say, 10) Relay_early cells can be sent across a circuit, and
only relay_early cells are allowed to contain extend requests. Each
intermediate server would pass on the same type of cell that it
received (either relay or relay_early), and the cell's destination
will be able to learn whether it's allowed to contain an Extend request.
If an intermediate server receives more than K relay_early cells, or
if it sees a relay cell that contains an extend request, then it
tears down the circuit (protocol violation).