https://thehackernews.com/2017/02/cross-browser-tracking.html describes a a cross-browser fingerprinting technique.

What can Tor Browser can do to defeat this?

  • 1
    I removed your remarks about official comment because the place to seek such comment is on the Tor project site.
    – user02814
    Mar 7 '17 at 10:18

All of those are already dealt with, with the exception of AudioContext which may get a similar treatment as canvas fingerprinting has.

See ticket #13017. Update: Tor Browser 7.0 disabled AudioContext fingerprinting by setting the new dom.webaudio.enabled option to false as a stop-gap measure, so this vector is also no longer fingerprintable by default.

The features tested currently includes time zone, number of CPU cores, GPU, hash values of GPU rendering results, plugins, fonts, audio, screen ratio and depth, WebGL, Ad blocking, canvas, cookies, encoding, and language.

Disabling javascript will fix most of these issues, which are not already handled. Infact the paper itself says:

Tor Browser normalizes many browser outputs to mitigate existing browser fingerprinting. That is, many features are unavailable in Tor Browsers—based on our test, only the following features, notably our newly proposed, still exist, which include the screen width and height ratio, and audio context information (e.g., sample rate and max channel count). We believe that it is easy for Tor Browser to normalize these remaining outputs.

Your Answer

By clicking “Post Your Answer”, you agree to our terms of service, privacy policy and cookie policy

Not the answer you're looking for? Browse other questions tagged or ask your own question.