Unfortunately, a secure end-to-end encrypted connection is not always an option in every case. The user's ISP is, in many cases (depends much on the country), probably more trustworthy than a random Tor exit node, which anyone can run. Many exit nodes are potentially malicious, run by spying agencies such as the NSA, FBI, or other malicious organizations. Even if they don't attempt to harm the user directly (MITM), they may spy on the user and log content of the connection.

I have to use an unencrypted connection in this specific case.

I know I cannot get ideal security this way, but I am looking for some exit nodes that are at least as secure to use as a good, reputable ISP. Ideally these nodes should be hosted by a reputable organization committed to privacy and not keeping logs. What should I look for, and what country should they be located in, if I want good privacy (Switzerland?)?

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    If I wanted to spy on Tor users (I don't), I'd set up my exit node in a "trustworthy" country and have it hosted by a "trustworthy" hosting company (or institution). Everyone believes that an exit node run by a Swiss university would be far safer than one run in an African warzone. The only way to really ensure the trustworthiness of an exit node is to run it yourself :) – Richard Horrocks May 29 '16 at 16:15

This idea will not work, if the service or application has a requirement for security in it's communications then it MUST provide it itself, there is no alternative.

This is the same as one of the VPN misnomers, the mistaken belief that if you pick a trustworthy VPN provider they will not tamper with your connection therefor your connection is safe. However, is it not only the VPN provider that can tamper with the data. Instead the truth is that series of routers through a series of ISPs of varying levels of repute all have opportunity to tamper with the data.

Okay you say, well what if I trustingly trust their trustworthy claims of trustiness and it turns out they are good and their ISP is good and every ISP between their ISP and the services ISP is good and all of their routers are immune to hacking, surely then we can trust that it won't be tampered with? Unfortunately, no. You could still be attacked through methods like BGP hijacking or QUANTUM INSERT.

There are many excellent people (many of whom I apologise to for not naming here, as you deserve to be) like torservers.net, Nos Oignons, RiseUp, Calyx, CCC, and hosts of others who all provide Tor relays and allow exiting but, and I'm sure they'd all agree with me on this point, trustworthiness of the service provider cannot replace well implemented end-to-end authenticated communications.

Instead advocate that the provider add TLS, with projects like LetsEncrypt and CertBot there is really no good excuse not too. Alternatively they could provide a Tor onion service to allow users to gain end-to-end encrypted and authenticated access.

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  • it's IMPOSSIBLE without a peer-to-peer key exchange : it's a philosopher's stone of cryptography. It's a "key distribution problem". I'm working on a workaround to enable persons to exchange keys, but it's not so versatile as it sounds – Alexey Vesnin May 29 '16 at 19:24