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user194
user194

Short answer is no, not really.

Timing attacks can be defended against by pumping a constant stream of data through the network. That's not foolproof, however, since an entry / intermediate node could introduce lag spikes which could then be analysed.

I believe that high-latency anonymity networks (anonymous remailers) have all kinds of timing attack defences; so maybe you want to look into those.

Additionally systems such as DC-nets should be immune to timing attacks because they work in a rather different way in which there are multiple possible previous hops along the path. Of course that's not compatible with Tor though.

Short answer is no, not really.

Timing attacks can be defended against by pumping a constant stream of data through the network. That's not foolproof, however, since an entry / intermediate node could introduce lag spikes which could then be analysed.

I believe that high-latency anonymity networks (anonymous remailers) have all kinds of timing attack defences; so maybe you want to look into those.

Additionally systems such as DC-nets should be immune to timing attacks because they work in a rather different way in which there are multiple possible previous hops along the path. Of course that's not compatible with Tor though.

Short answer is no, not really.

Timing attacks can be defended against by pumping a constant stream of data through the network. That's not foolproof, however, since an entry / intermediate node could introduce lag spikes which could then be analysed.

I believe that high-latency anonymity networks (anonymous remailers) have all kinds of timing attack defences; so maybe you want to look into those.

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user194
user194

Short answer is no, not really.

Timing attacks can be defended against by pumping a constant stream of data through the network. That's not foolproof, however, since an entry / intermediate node could introduce lag spikes which could then be analysed.

I believe that high-latency anonymity networks (anonymous remailers) have all kinds of timing attack defences; so maybe you want to look into those.

Additionally systems such as DC-nets should be immune to timing attacks because they work in a rather different way in which there are multiple possible previous hops along the path. Of course that's not compatible with Tor though.

Short answer is no, not really.

Timing attacks can be defended against by pumping a constant stream of data through the network. That's not foolproof, however, since an entry / intermediate node could introduce lag spikes which could then be analysed.

I believe that high-latency anonymity networks (anonymous remailers) have all kinds of timing attack defences; so maybe you want to look into those.

Short answer is no, not really.

Timing attacks can be defended against by pumping a constant stream of data through the network. That's not foolproof, however, since an entry / intermediate node could introduce lag spikes which could then be analysed.

I believe that high-latency anonymity networks (anonymous remailers) have all kinds of timing attack defences; so maybe you want to look into those.

Additionally systems such as DC-nets should be immune to timing attacks because they work in a rather different way in which there are multiple possible previous hops along the path. Of course that's not compatible with Tor though.

Source Link
user194
user194

Short answer is no, not really.

Timing attacks can be defended against by pumping a constant stream of data through the network. That's not foolproof, however, since an entry / intermediate node could introduce lag spikes which could then be analysed.

I believe that high-latency anonymity networks (anonymous remailers) have all kinds of timing attack defences; so maybe you want to look into those.