Tor can't protect against traffic confirmation (also known as end-to-end correlation), where an attacker tries to confirm an hypothesis by monitoring the right locations in the network and then doing the math. The question is: Is it enough for the adversary to compromise any two of the three nodes to be able to de-anonymize the client? Specifically consider the following:

Guard (compromised) + Middle node (compromised) + Exit node (not compromised) = Result in Client de-anonymized

Guard (compromised) + Middle node (not compromised) + Exit node (compromised) = Result in Client de-anonymized

Guard (not compromised) + Middle node (compromised) + Exit node (compromised) = Result in Client de-anonymized

Do all three cases detailed above result in client de-anonymization? and How?

Tor can't protect against traffic confirmation (also known as end-to-end correlation), where an attacker tries to confirm an hypothesis by monitoring the right locations in the network and then doing the math. The question is: Is it enough for the adversary to compromise any two of the three nodes to be able to de-anonymize the client? Specifically consider the following:

Guard (compromised) + Middle node (compromised) + Exit node (not compromised) = Result in Client de-anonymized

Guard (compromised) + Middle node (not compromised) + Exit node (compromised) = Result in Client de-anonymized

Guard (not compromised) + Middle node (compromised) + Exit node (compromised) = Result in Client de-anonymized

Do all three cases detailed above result in client de-anonymization?