Skip to main content
Commonmark migration
Source Link

Despite the manual's declared defaults [below], Onion Circuits shows single hop circuits being "Built" by Tor. So I have edited my torrc to specifically include ExcludeSingleHopRelays 1 and AllowSingleHopCircuits 0. Yet Onion Circuits still shows them being "Built".

Careful observation of the (often four?) initial one-hop circuits that are built at Tails boot (presumably used to "build consensus" as to which of them will continue on to be my "guard" for that session) tells me that the one-hop circuits that Tor will still build later in that particular session ARE from those initial four [at least the ones where I've noticed a later one-hop].

So I guess I can see why Tor builds those initially. While I understand that my IP is known to my "guard", why do those other potential candidates check in again later, and build one-hop circuits?

I am using Tails 2.9.1, and the torrc file at etc/tor/torrc. Other edits to that file function.

The manual states:

ExcludeSingleHopRelays 0|1

This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally included. Also note that relatively few clients turn off this option, so using these relays might make your client stand out. (Default: 1)

 

AllowSingleHopCircuits 0|1

When this option is set, the attached Tor controller can use relays that have the AllowSingleHopExits option turned on to build one-hop Tor connections. (Default: 0)

[I have not specifcally set the SERVER OPTION AllowSingleHopExits 0|1 to 0, (which is its default anyways), because I am not running a server.]

Despite the manual's declared defaults [below], Onion Circuits shows single hop circuits being "Built" by Tor. So I have edited my torrc to specifically include ExcludeSingleHopRelays 1 and AllowSingleHopCircuits 0. Yet Onion Circuits still shows them being "Built".

Careful observation of the (often four?) initial one-hop circuits that are built at Tails boot (presumably used to "build consensus" as to which of them will continue on to be my "guard" for that session) tells me that the one-hop circuits that Tor will still build later in that particular session ARE from those initial four [at least the ones where I've noticed a later one-hop].

So I guess I can see why Tor builds those initially. While I understand that my IP is known to my "guard", why do those other potential candidates check in again later, and build one-hop circuits?

I am using Tails 2.9.1, and the torrc file at etc/tor/torrc. Other edits to that file function.

The manual states:

ExcludeSingleHopRelays 0|1

This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally included. Also note that relatively few clients turn off this option, so using these relays might make your client stand out. (Default: 1)

 

AllowSingleHopCircuits 0|1

When this option is set, the attached Tor controller can use relays that have the AllowSingleHopExits option turned on to build one-hop Tor connections. (Default: 0)

[I have not specifcally set the SERVER OPTION AllowSingleHopExits 0|1 to 0, (which is its default anyways), because I am not running a server.]

Despite the manual's declared defaults [below], Onion Circuits shows single hop circuits being "Built" by Tor. So I have edited my torrc to specifically include ExcludeSingleHopRelays 1 and AllowSingleHopCircuits 0. Yet Onion Circuits still shows them being "Built".

Careful observation of the (often four?) initial one-hop circuits that are built at Tails boot (presumably used to "build consensus" as to which of them will continue on to be my "guard" for that session) tells me that the one-hop circuits that Tor will still build later in that particular session ARE from those initial four [at least the ones where I've noticed a later one-hop].

So I guess I can see why Tor builds those initially. While I understand that my IP is known to my "guard", why do those other potential candidates check in again later, and build one-hop circuits?

I am using Tails 2.9.1, and the torrc file at etc/tor/torrc. Other edits to that file function.

The manual states:

ExcludeSingleHopRelays 0|1

This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally included. Also note that relatively few clients turn off this option, so using these relays might make your client stand out. (Default: 1)

AllowSingleHopCircuits 0|1

When this option is set, the attached Tor controller can use relays that have the AllowSingleHopExits option turned on to build one-hop Tor connections. (Default: 0)

[I have not specifcally set the SERVER OPTION AllowSingleHopExits 0|1 to 0, (which is its default anyways), because I am not running a server.]

Source Link
agd
  • 51
  • 2
  • 6

Can I prevent Tor from building single-hop circuits?

Despite the manual's declared defaults [below], Onion Circuits shows single hop circuits being "Built" by Tor. So I have edited my torrc to specifically include ExcludeSingleHopRelays 1 and AllowSingleHopCircuits 0. Yet Onion Circuits still shows them being "Built".

Careful observation of the (often four?) initial one-hop circuits that are built at Tails boot (presumably used to "build consensus" as to which of them will continue on to be my "guard" for that session) tells me that the one-hop circuits that Tor will still build later in that particular session ARE from those initial four [at least the ones where I've noticed a later one-hop].

So I guess I can see why Tor builds those initially. While I understand that my IP is known to my "guard", why do those other potential candidates check in again later, and build one-hop circuits?

I am using Tails 2.9.1, and the torrc file at etc/tor/torrc. Other edits to that file function.

The manual states:

ExcludeSingleHopRelays 0|1

This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally included. Also note that relatively few clients turn off this option, so using these relays might make your client stand out. (Default: 1)

AllowSingleHopCircuits 0|1

When this option is set, the attached Tor controller can use relays that have the AllowSingleHopExits option turned on to build one-hop Tor connections. (Default: 0)

[I have not specifcally set the SERVER OPTION AllowSingleHopExits 0|1 to 0, (which is its default anyways), because I am not running a server.]